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The advent of cyberspace has created a new, unregulated dimension of warfare, 
which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has striven to manage. This thesis 
raises the following question: To what extent is NATO cybernetically, politically, 
militarily, and economically prepared to respond to a major act of cyberwar against one 
or more of its members? The thesis evaluates NATO’s level of preparedness across seven 
areas: cyber strategy, cyber cooperation, decision making, political will, crisis 
management, defense spending, and defense policy prioritization. The thesis concludes 
that NATO is moderately prepared to respond effectively to a major act of cyberwar 
launched against one or more of the Allies. NATO’s implementation of its cyber policies 
and cooperative partnerships probably make it cybernetically prepared to address major 
acts of cyberwar; however, challenges with decision making, public support, crisis 
management, defense spending, and defense policies could make NATO less than 
optimally effective in responding with force to acts of cyber aggression that rise to the 
level of a conventional armed attack. The thesis recommends that NATO enhance its 
efforts in cyber strategy development, cyber cooperation, decisional delegation, strategic 
messaging, and defense spending to address challenges resulting from the evolving 
complexity and heterogeneity of cyber incidents. 
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The advent of cyberspace has created a new, unregulated dimension of warfare, 
which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has striven to define and manage. 
Over the years, the Alliance has taken great strides to modernize its framework to meet 
cybersecurity challenges. At the Wales Summit in September 2014, NATO made an 
unprecedented declaration: cyber defense would become a component of its core task of 
collective defense.1 This announcement came at a time of pronounced cyber aggression 
toward Alliance members, which has raised questions about NATO’s readiness to 
respond to major threats in cyberspace. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis raises the following research questions: To what extent is NATO 
cybernetically, politically, militarily, and economically prepared to respond effectively to 
a major act of cyber aggression launched against one or more of its members? How have 
cyber attacks against NATO Allies and partners influenced the Alliance, and how has the 
Alliance responded? To what extent has NATO adapted organizationally to respond to 
cyber aggression? In the case of a cyberwar that transcended the cyber dimension and 
extended into the physical dimension of kinetic operations, would the Alliance be ready 
to respond decisively with force?  
The study focuses on the evolution of the Alliance against a backdrop of 
cyberwarfare campaigns launched in its own backyard, including in Georgia and Ukraine. 
Furthermore, it discusses NATO’s cyber achievements and the factors that complicate the 
formulation and implementation of more effective Alliance responses to cybersecurity 
challenges. It also assesses how prepared NATO is to respond cybernetically, politically, 
and kinetically against adversaries who initiate aggression via cyberspace. Finally, the 
thesis examines the conditions under which NATO is more likely to respond with 
                                                 
1 “Wales Summit Declaration,” NATO, September 5, 2014, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_112964.htm, par. 72. 
 2 
collective defense measures to a major act of cyberwar and considers whether these 
measures would necessarily involve the use of force.  
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Cyberspace is a physical and virtual domain that is comprised of computer 
hardware, information infrastructure, and electronic systems, which make digital 
interactions and communications possible.2 The cyber dimension has emerged as one of 
the most indispensable and yet vulnerable domains. Cyber attackers have increased 
digital attacks against both private industry and state actors to fulfill various political, 
informational, military, and financial agendas.3 Cyber attacks against critical 
infrastructure—that is, systems, networks, organizational structures, and resources vital 
to a nation’s security and well-being—have the power to destabilize organizations, 
industries, and nations.4 For most NATO members, the vulnerability of critical 
infrastructure and information systems within the energy, financial, telecommunications, 
and health sectors represents the leading concern.5  
An act of cyber aggression on a nation’s financial industry could trigger a 
regional economic crisis. A cyber attack that releases sensitive information on a 
presidential candidate could influence the results of a ballot decision, corrupt the 
institutional integrity of nationally held elections, and even prompt regime change. 
Moreover, a cyber attack that disabled a country’s power grid or contaminated its water 
supply could create social havoc and paralyze national activity. The Center for Strategic 
and International Studies has shown the ubiquity of cyber threats by publishing reports on 
major cyber incidents involving espionage and attacks committed by state and non-state 
agents. Some of the organizations and industries that have incurred significant cyber 
                                                 
2 Alison Lawlor Russell, Cyber Blockades (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), 2.  
3 Jens Stoltenberg, “NATO and Cyber Attacks: Time to Raise Our Game,” The Parliament, July 29, 
2016, https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/blog/nato-and-cyber-attacks-time-raise-our-game, 1. 
4 The White House,  Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, PPD-21, Washington, DC: Office 
of the Press Secretary, 2013, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-
directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil, 1.  
5 Benjamin S. Buckland, Fred Schreier, and Theodor H. Winkler, “Democratic Governance 
Challenges of Cybersecurity,” DCAF Horizon 2015 Working Paper, no.1, 2015, http://www.dcaf.ch/
Publications/Democratic-Governance-Challenges-of-Cyber-Security, 9. 
 3 
intrusions and attacks include the U.S. Democratic National Committee (2016), the U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (2015), the White House (2014, 2015), the U.S. State Department 
(2006, 2014), Sony Pictures Entertainment (2014), the U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management (2014), the U.S. Department of Energy (2014), the European Aeronautic 
Defense and Space Company (2013), 23 U.S. gas pipelines (2011-2012), Google (2010, 
2011), NASA (2011), the International Monetary Fund (2011), the European 
Commission (2011), the European Union (2011), and NASDAQ (2010).6 While these 
examples provide a glimpse of the power of cybernetic weapons, they also show that 
cyberspace represents much more than just another military conduit of modern warfare. 
Policy makers and members of the military use the DIME principle to discuss the 
four ways through which a nation develops and projects its power: diplomacy, 
information, the military, and economics. Up until now, this principle was sufficient to 
address the primary instruments of state power; however, it overlooks the cyber domain, 
which touches all four areas—not just the informational or military spheres. Not only is 
cyber capability a quintessential element of national power, it has application in and 
influence over the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic arms of every state 
actor. Indeed, before the Allies can begin to address the challenges of cyberspace, they 
must first recognize their profound and far-reaching vulnerabilities in the cyber domain. 
NATO has already begun transforming its perspectives on cyber, unequivocally putting 
the “C” in DIME (“DIMEC”). In this regard, the Alliance is leading the endeavor to 
address the cyber challenges of a 21st century world order.  
In light of Russia’s alleged cyber attack campaign against Estonia in 2007, against 
Georgia in 2008, and against Ukraine since 2013, NATO’s cyber warfare preparedness 
has become a prominent topic of interest. Evaluating the preparedness of the Alliance—
namely, NATO’s capability, readiness, and willingness to respond effectively to a cyber 
act of war—is essential to identifying areas of improvement for the largest defense 
organization in the world. If NATO failed to react effectively in a cyber or hybrid war 
                                                 
6 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006,” August 24, 
2016, https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/cybersecurity/significant-cyber-
incidents, 1, 3–5, 6–11, 13–14. 
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scenario,7 it could weaken the Alliance in the eyes of its Allies and its adversaries. If 
NATO suffered losses during a cyberwarfare contingency, it would have to react to 
restore the security and integrity of the affected NATO area. For these reasons, the 
Alliance cannot afford to be unprepared for cyberwar. 
C. EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
As of 2016, a cyber attack has not brought a nation to war. NATO’s Wales and 
Warsaw Summits affirmations nonetheless confirm that the Allies recognize that the 
potential exists for cyber aggression to trigger a kinetic war.8 If an Ally experienced a 
major act of cyberwar, NATO may be more cybernetically than politically, economically, 
and militarily prepared to respond effectively. NATO’s robust cyber strategy and 
extensive cooperative partnerships offset some of the organization’s shortfalls in decision 
making, political resolve, crisis management readiness, and defense spending. NATO 
must continue its leadership role in the cybersecurity domain to meet evolving challenges 
resulting from technical and legal complexities, attribution difficulties, and the increasing 
diversity of cybernetic weapons.9 If the Alliance wishes to remain ready and relevant in 
all security domains, it must advance its preparedness in the cyber one.  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis takes a qualitative approach to investigate NATO’s level of 
preparedness to respond to an act of cyberwar against one or more of its Allies. The body 
of research analyzes policy papers, journal articles, the North Atlantic Treaty (frequently 
referred to as the Washington Treaty), defense reports, public poll surveys, and case 
studies. The thesis evaluates NATO’s historical responses to the most recent 
geopolitically significant cyber attacks against NATO members and non-NATO 
countries. It also builds on current scholarship on NATO’s cyber defense capabilities by 
                                                 
7 Hybrid war is a military strategy that exploits multiple dimensions of warfare; hybrid tactics blend 
conventional military methods with unconventional forms of warfare that may include psychological or 
deception operations, cybernetic espionage and attacks, disinformation, and propaganda (Damien Van 
Puyveld, “Hybrid War—Does It Even Exist?” NATO Review, 2015, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/
Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-ukraine/EN/, 1.) 
8 “Wales Summit Declaration,” par. 72. 
9 Buckland, Schreier, and Winkler, “Democratic Governance Challenges,” 18–19.  
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assessing the cyber response policies, organizational evolution, cooperative partnerships, 
and decision-making protocols within the NATO framework. Since the study focuses on 
advances in cyber technology and policy, much of the research stems from the last five 
years. Additionally, the thesis evaluates public opinion trends and NATO’s coalition 
performance to assess its readiness to conduct military operations if the collective defense 
principle (Article 5)10 is invoked. Finally, the analysis examines economic data and 
policy white papers to evaluate spending patterns, defense commitments, and national 
security priorities to recommend relevant changes in policy and effort. The thesis reviews 
NATO’s level of preparedness across seven key areas:  
Cyber strategy. The thesis assesses the quality of NATO’s current cyber 
policy, doctrine, and standard operating procedures across three focal 
areas: comprehensiveness, execution, and clarity. It further evaluates the 
organization’s structural and policy changes made in response to large-
scale cyber attacks launched against NATO, its Allies, and its partners. 
Cyber cooperation. The thesis assesses the technical partnerships and 
level of cooperation among Alliance members and external agencies on 
cybersecurity matters.  
Decision making. The thesis studies NATO’s institutional protocols to 
assess the organization’s decision-making processes and procedures. 
Political will. The thesis reviews international surveys, political news 
articles, and the geopolitical context to ascertain the likelihood that public 
consensus within Alliance member states would support a collective 
defense response to a major act of cyberwar against an Ally. 
Crisis management. The thesis evaluates NATO’s crisis management 
procedures, objectives, and operational performance during major combat 
operations to assess its crisis response effectiveness. 
Defense spending. The thesis evaluates national defense spending trends, 
cyber defense spending, and the economic readiness of five prominent 
NATO members—France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the United 
States—in order to assess the Alliance’s capacity to finance and sustain 
military operations if a cyberwar turned kinetic.  
                                                 
10 Article 5 is the collective defense principle espoused in the Washington Treaty, which declares that 
an attack on one Ally is an attack on all of them; this principle of solidarity ensures that Alliance members 
will come together to assist in the mutual defense of one another in the case of an armed act of aggression 
(NATO, “Collective Defense—Article 5,” March 22, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_110496.htm, 1). 
 6 
Defense policy prioritization. The thesis examines the national security 
and defense plans, objectives, and threat priorities of five leading NATO 
members—France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the United States—in 
order to assess the Alliance’s capacity and resolve to intervene militarily 
on behalf of an Ally first attacked in cyberspace. 
The thesis employs a performance metric that ranks NATO’s cyber strategy, 
cyber cooperation, decision making, political will, crisis management, defense spending, 
and defense policy prioritization in order to determine how ready the Alliance is to 
effectively address cyberwar threats to Euro-Atlantic security and stability. This metric of 
preparedness consists of the following three levels:  
Minimal level of preparedness. This is the lowest level of preparedness. 
At this level, the Alliance would not meet minimum standards of readiness 
to effectively address, counter, and/or resolve an act of cyberwar against 
one or more of its members. Out of a numerical value ranking of 1–3, the 
Alliance would earn a score of 1.  
Moderate level of preparedness. This represents an average or medium 
level of preparedness. At this level, the Alliance would meet the minimum 
standards of readiness to effectively address, counter, and/or resolve an act 
of cyberwar against one or more of its members. Out of a numerical value 
ranking of 1–3, the Alliance would earn a score of 2. 
High level of preparedness. This is the highest level of preparedness. At 
this level, the Alliance would meet or exceed most standards of readiness 
to effectively address, counter, and/or resolve an act of cyberwar against 
one or more of its members. Out of a numerical value ranking of 1–3, the 
Alliance would earn a score of 3. 
E. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The central elements of this thesis address NATO’s overall preparedness to 
respond to a major act of cyber aggression against one or more of its members. The thesis 
is organized as follows: Chapter II provides a literature review concerning the most 
pertinent works related to the study. Chapter III offers an overview of cyber warfare and 
defense terminologies and describes the primary challenges, threats, and actors that 
NATO faces in cyberspace. Chapter IV discusses historical case studies of large-scale 
cyber attacks—past and ongoing—launched against NATO Allies and partners; it further 
considers NATO’s political and organizational responsiveness in each of these cases. 
 7 
Chapter V critically evaluates the strengths, weaknesses, and changes in the 
organization’s level of preparedness to respond to a major act of cyberwar from a 
cybernetic, political, military, and economic perspective. It specifically assesses the 
Alliance in the areas of cyber strategy, cyber cooperation, decision making, political will, 
crisis management, defense spending, and defense policy prioritization. Chapter VI 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The topic of cyber defense has gained significant attention among governments, 
scholars, think tanks, industries, citizens, and international organizations. The rising 
interest in cyberspace shows in the vast collection of works available today on cyber 
warfare, defense, governance, and security. A reasonable subset of literature is devoted to 
the study of cyber and NATO—specifically, how NATO can develop and enhance its 
cyber capabilities and address virtual threats. Yet few studies critically examine the 
preparedness of the world’s largest military Alliance to respond effectively to cyberwar. 
This thesis is intended to address this gap in the literature and to make a useful 
contribution to knowledge. The literature review evaluates eight pieces of scholarship, 
beginning with works that examine NATO’s cyber capabilities and shortfalls. 
A. HANNES KRAUSE  
In a monograph titled “NATO on Its Way Towards a Comfort Zone in Cyber 
Defense,” Hannes Krause offers an assessment of the progress made and the challenges 
encountered by NATO’s cyber defense policies over the last few years. His report raises 
practical questions about Article 5 invocation—specifically the scope of the action that 
NATO should undertake to support an Ally attacked in the cyber domain.11 He 
summarizes the Alliance’s primary challenges as operational inflexibility, information 
sharing, and cyber interoperability.12 He concludes with the following four 
recommendations: (1) that NATO act as an intermediary rather than as a provider of 
cyber assistance, (2) that NATO incorporate cyber in the defense planning process, (3) 
that NATO increase its transparency, and (4) that NATO integrate cyber scenarios into its 
military exercises.13  
                                                 
11 Hannes Krause, “NATO on Its Way Towards a Comfort Zone in Cyber Defense,” The Tallinn 
Papers, no. 3, Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, 2014, https://ccdcoe.org/sites/default/files/
multimedia/pdf/TP_03.pdf, 2.  
12 Krause, “NATO on Its Way,” 3–4.  
13 Krause, “NATO on Its Way,” 3–5.  
 10 
Krause presents valid findings. Indeed, the Alliance has already adopted to some 
extent many of his recommendations. Nonetheless, he does not discuss the potential 
negative consequences of cyber intelligence sharing among NATO members, which have 
varying levels of network security, cyber infrastructure, and national information 
assurance standards. While Krause never explicitly raises the question of NATO’s 
readiness to counter an attack in the cyber realm, he does suggest that if NATO takes the 
four steps he prescribes, the organization will be closer to achieving its “cyber defense 
comfort zone.”14 One of the objectives of this thesis is to assess how far NATO has come 
with instituting improvements in its cyber capabilities, defenses, and policies. 
B. REX HUGHES 
Like Krause, Rex Hughes, who authored “NATO in Cyberspace: Digital 
Defenses,” believes the Alliance has come a long way to address security problems in the 
electronic or “e” domain. While NATO has taken such milestone steps as creating the 
Cyber Defense Management Authority (CDMA) and opening the Cooperative Cyber 
Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE), the Alliance has made less progress in other 
areas.15 Hughes asserts that NATO has not made demonstrable movement in formulating 
a global vision for cybersecurity and in advocating the enforcement of international legal 
standards regarding acts of cyberwar and cyberterrorism.16 Since the writing of his article 
in 2009, however, NATO’s CCDCOE has published the Tallinn Manual on the 
International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, providing guiding principles for the 
conduct of nation states during cyberwar.17 Yet, the legal conundrums surrounding cyber 
issues still persist, such as NATO’s authority to conduct offensive cyber attacks or hack-
back operations and the roles and responsibilities of prosecuting authorities under the 
Law of Armed Conflict, telecommunications regulations, and Article 51 of the United 
                                                 
14 Krause, “NATO on Its Way,” 6. 
15 Rex Hughes, “NATO in Cyberspace: Digital Defenses,” World Today, 65, no. 4 (April 2009): 20.  
16 Hughes, “NATO in Cyberspace,” 20–21. 
17 Jeffrey L. Caton, Distinguishing Acts of War in Cyberspace: Assessment Criteria, Policy 
Considerations, and Response Implications (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 
2014), 22.  
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Nations (UN) Charter.18 Although NATO has taken critical strides in coordinating 
technical and legal policies in cyber defense, Hughes’ article makes clear that there is still 
much for the Alliance to do in tackling the legal challenges of cyberspace.  
C. NIKITAS NIKITAKOS AND PANOS MAVROPOULOS 
In Cyber-Development, Cyber-Democracy and Cyber-Defense: Challenges, 
Opportunities, and Implications for Theory, Policy, and Practice, edited by Elias G. 
Carayannis, David F. J. Campbell, and Marios Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos, the authors 
explore the implications of information technology for policy, law, democracy, and 
national security.19 In Chapter 10, Nikitas Nikitakos and Panos Mavropoulos discuss how 
cyber can both serve as an extension of a state’s power and as a source of major 
vulnerability due to its unregulated, unprotected, and complex nature.20 According to 
Nikitakos and Mavropoulos, cyberwar—like any war—is politically motivated; its 
ultimate objective is to compel the enemy to bend to one’s will, sometimes by 
manipulating or weakening the public resolve of the adversary via attacks on critical 
infrastructure.21 The authors’ conclusions about cyberwar are applicable to this thesis 
because one must first comprehend why attackers strike in the cyber domain before 
assessing NATO’s preparedness to thwart such attacks. One of the authors’ conclusions 
about cyberwar is that it “is not coming…cyberwar has already arrived,” which signifies 
that it is not a question of if a cyberwar could arrive on NATO’s doorstep, but when.22  
                                                 
18 Hughes, “NATO in Cyberspace,” 21.  
19 Elias G. Carayannis, David F. J. Campbell, and Marios Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos, ed. Cyber-
Development, Cyber-Democracy and Cyber-Defense: Challenges, Opportunities, and Implications for 
Theory, Policy, and Practice (New York: Springer, 2014), v. 
20 Nikitas Nikitakos and Panos Mavropoulos, “Cyberspace as a State’s Element of Power” in Cyber-
Development, Cyber-Democracy and Cyber-Defense: Challenges, Opportunities, and Implications for 
Theory, Policy, and Practice, ed. Elias G. Carayannis, David F. J. Campbell, and Marios Panagiotis 
Efthymiopoulos (New York: Springer, 2014), 260.  
21 Nikitakos and Mavropoulos, “Cyberspace as a State’s Element of Power,” 266.  
22 Nikitakos and Mavropoulos, “Cyberspace as a State’s Element of Power,” 276.  
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D. PYTHAGORAS PETRATOS 
In Chapter 11 of Cyber-Development, Cyber-Democracy and Cyber-Defense: 
Challenges, Opportunities, and Implications for Theory, Policy, and Practice, Pythagoras 
Petratos delves into the cyber policies and institutions of NATO and the European Union 
(EU).23 He finds that disparities among NATO and EU member states in cyber capability, 
technical infrastructure development, investment, and burden sharing have severely 
limited progress within the area of cyber governance.24 He pertinently questions the EU’s 
capacity to lead and sustain military operations on a significant scale while maintaining 
the security and control of its internal cyber networks.25 This thesis applies to NATO the 
operational queries that Petratos raises about the EU in order to investigate the Alliance’s 
military preparedness for cyberwar. If cyber aggression turns kinetic, does the Alliance 
have the capability, capacity, and will to sustain its engagement in the conventional 
warfighting domain and prevail? The thesis endeavors to answer this question. While the 
thesis disagrees with Petratos’s assertion regarding the possibility of a cyber arms race 
between the United States and the EU, it concurs that the cyber innovation and 
investment divide between the United States and its European Allies has led to “free 
rider” problems in NATO.26 In the same way that Petratos considers whether the EU 
invests sufficiently in its information and communications technology (ICT) 
infrastructure,27 this thesis evaluates some of NATO’s ICT budgets. Petratos concludes 
that the EU must increase its spending and enhance its cooperation with the public sector, 
private industry, and NATO, which is in line with current mainstream thinking.28  
                                                 
23 Pythagoras Petratos, “Cybersecurity in Europe: Cooperation and Investment” in Cyber-
Development, Cyber-Democracy and Cyber-Defense: Challenges, Opportunities, and Implications for 
Theory, Policy, and Practice, ed. Elias G. Carayannis, David F. J. Campbell, and Marios Panagiotis 
Efthymiopoulos (New York: Springer, 2014), 278. 
24 Petratos, “Cybersecurity in Europe: Cooperation and Investment,” 278.  
25 Petratos, “Cybersecurity in Europe: Cooperation and Investment,” 289.  
26 Petratos, “Cybersecurity in Europe: Cooperation and Investment,” 296.  
27 Petratos, “Cybersecurity in Europe: Cooperation and Investment,” 297.  
28 Petratos, “Cybersecurity in Europe: Cooperation and Investment,” 298.  
 13 
E. MARIOS PANAGIOTIS EFTHYMIOPOULOS 
In Chapter 12 of Cyber-Development, Cyber-Democracy and Cyber-Defense: 
Challenges, Opportunities, and Implications for Theory, Policy, and Practice, Marios 
Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos discusses NATO’s Smart Defense policy as it relates to the 
Alliance’s cyber defense strategy. He holds that NATO is “well prepared” for “current 
and future challenges” in cyber, arguing that the Alliance should continue to innovate, 
evolve, and enhance its policies and methods.29 The chapter concludes with proposals 
that are similar to those advanced by Krause—above all, greater information sharing.30 
Efthymiopoulos also proposes changes that deviate from the mainstream, including but 
not limited to the establishment of a NATO Center of Excellence for Electronic Warfare 
(EW), joint-level military cooperation in EW, and budgets structured around cyber 
requirements as defined by the Smart Defense paradigm.31 While some of these proposals 
are noteworthy, a few fail to address the consequences of—and strategic obstacles to—
multinational information sharing within the highly sensitive domain of electronic 
warfare. 
F. FRANKLIN D. KRAMER 
In “Achieving International Cyber Stability,” Franklin D. Kramer delves into the 
role that cyber could play in modern warfare and the detrimental effects that cyberspace 
could have on critical infrastructure; he also evaluates how NATO and other international 
organizations, including the EU, could help achieve overall stability in cyberspace to 
prevent cyber incidents from escalating into geopolitical conflicts.32 Likewise, Kramer 
underscores the critical role that resiliency, transparency, and cooperation play in the 
cybernetic domain and recommends cyber norms that complement many of the guidelines 
                                                 
29 Marios Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos, “NATO’s Cyber-Defense: A Methodology for Smart Defense” 
in Cyber-Development, Cyber-Democracy and Cyber-Defense: Challenges, Opportunities, and 
Implications for Theory, Policy, and Practice, ed. Elias G. Carayannis, David F. J. Campbell, and Marios 
Panagiotis Efthymiopoulos (New York: Springer, 2014), 305–306.  
30 Efthymiopoulos, “NATO’s Cyber-Defense,” 316.  
31 Efthymiopoulos, “NATO’s Cyber-Defense,” 316.  
32 Franklin D. Kramer, “Achieving International Cyber Stability,” Atlantic Council, (2012), 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/publication_pdfs/403/kramer_cyber_final.pdf, 1.  
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in the Tallinn Manual.33 In addition to other proposals, he submits that nations should 
take steps to upgrade hardware and software capabilities, engage with Internet service 
providers on potential network threats, establish a Cyber Stability Board with likeminded 
governments and private sector actors, and cooperate transparently with partners and 
adversaries on common cybersecurity issues.34 Kramer’s proposed initiatives and 
operational approaches to cyber stability make his work an invaluable contribution to the 
cyber policy debate.35  
G. JASON HEALEY AND LEENDERT VAN BOCHOVEN 
In “Strategic Cyber Early Warning: A Phased Adaptive Approach for NATO,” 
Jason Healey and Leendert van Bochoven contend that NATO should develop an 
advanced cyber distant early warning monitoring system to afford decision-makers 
adequate time to address major cyber incidents.36 Healey and van Bochoven make 
practical proposals, such as encouraging the Alliance to depend more on the private 
sector for early warning intelligence, since private industry maintains the best resources, 
processes, and indications and warning systems already in place.37 Additionally, Healey 
and van Bochoven advocate the Alliance engage with civilian and military computer 
emergency response teams (CERT) and expand the intelligence capability of NATO’s 
Cyber Threat Analysis Cell (CTAC).38 By focusing on strategic cyber attacks and 
incorporating the abovementioned solutions into a cyber phased adaptive approach 
modelled after the European Phased Adaptive Approach in the U.S. Ballistic Missile 
Defense program, NATO can credibly prepare for large-scale cyber incidents without 
significant pain or cost.39  
                                                 
33 Kramer, “Achieving International Cyber Stability,” 1. 
34 Kramer, “Achieving International Cyber Stability,” 2, 8. 
35 Kramer, “Achieving International Cyber Stability,” 6, 10, 12.  
36 Jason Healey and Leendert van Bochoven, “Strategic Cyber Early Warning: A Phased Adaptive 
Approach for NATO,” Atlantic Council (2012), Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council of the United 
States, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/files/publication_pdfs/403/
NATO%20Cyber%20Warning%202012.pdf., 1.  
37 Healey and van Bochoven, “Strategic Cyber Early Warning,” 1, 7.  
38 Healey and van Bochoven, “Strategic Cyber Early Warning,” 7.  
39 Healey and van Bochoven, “Strategic Cyber Early Warning,” 7.  
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The authors present a credible argument, asserting that NATO must prioritize 
strategic-level cyber attacks that could trigger Article 440 or Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty above everyday tactical-level cyber attacks.41 Although Healey and van 
Bochoven wrote their paper in 2012, their recommendations still have merit for this 
thesis. A significant component of this study is to assess NATO’s cyber response 
preparedness, which is dependent upon the organization’s ability to anticipate, detect, and 
resolve network intrusions before they rise to the level of an Article 5 response. 
H. JASON HEALEY AND KLARA TOTHOVA JORDAN 
Jason Healey and Klara Tothova Jordan in “NATO’s Cyber Capabilities: 
Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow” offer one of the most succinct and yet thorough 
reports on NATO’s progress in developing its cyber vision, capabilities, and policies. 
Healey and Jordan provide a timeline of the Alliance’s cyber milestones, discussing in 
detail the establishment of the 2002 Cyber Defense Program, the NATO Computer 
Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), the 2008 NATO Cyber Defense Policy, the 
Cyber Defense Management Board, the Cyber Defense Committee, and the 2014 
Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defense.42 Healey and Jordan emphasize that NATO 
has done more than just alter its institutions and policies—it has changed its mindset and 
awakened to the realities of its e-security environment.43 The report offers practical 
solutions to the cyber problems facing the Alliance, advocating robust coordination with 
the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), especially 
through involvement in NATO exercises.44 Healey and van Bochoven also propose that 
                                                 
40 Article 4 is the principle of consultation espoused in the Washington Treaty; it affords NATO 
member states the opportunity to meet, consult, and voice official opinions on an issue before any formal 
decision or action is taken on its behalf. (NATO, “The Consultation Process and Article 4,” March 17, 
2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49187.htm, 1). 
41 Healey and van Bochoven, “Strategic Cyber Early Warning,” 1–2, 5.  
42 Jason Healey and Klara Tothova Jordan, “NATO’s Cyber Capabilities: Yesterday, Today, and 
Tomorrow,” Atlantic Council, September 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/
NATOs_Cyber_Capabilities.pdf, 1–5.  
43 Healey and Jordan, “NATO’s Cyber Capabilities,” 2, 7. 
44 Healey and Jordan, “NATO’s Cyber Capabilities,” 6.  
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the Alliance consider offensive coordination efforts that do not divulge sensitive 
information on national cyber capabilities.45  
While much of the literature on NATO’s cyber capabilities reiterates the need for 
greater information sharing, Healey and Jordan go beyond this. They suggest that NATO 
foster relationships with cyber institutions in the private sector and build cyber crisis 
coordination cells outside of Rapid Reaction Teams (RRT) that employ technical experts 
and military leadership alike.46 While the authors contend that an Article 4 or Article 5 
response resulting from a cyber attack is likely to occur during an ongoing geopolitical 
conflict, it is also possible that a major cyber attack could precede or trigger a crisis.47 
Overall, the article by Healey and Jordan is rich in information regarding NATO’s past, 
present, and future in cyberspace and is consistent with most mainstream analyses about 
NATO’s cyber readiness and the way forward. 
I. JAMIE SHEA 
In his article titled “NATO: The Challenges Ahead,” Jamie Shea, NATO’s 
Deputy Assistant Secretary General for Emerging Security Challenges, evaluates the 
current strategic security issues confronting the Alliance, such as transnational terrorism 
and a resurgent Russia.48 He discusses cyber in conjunction with the hybrid warfare 
debate, attempting to determine how NATO—an organization that traditionally operates 
reactively based on hard intelligence and thorough deliberation—can adapt to respond 
proactively and decisively based on ambiguous and fragmentary information.49 He 
proposes NATO reforms that address budgetary inefficiencies and nominal coordination 
efforts with the EU.50 In addition, he goes beyond the scope of the proposals made by 
some of his contemporaries by addressing the need for NATO to develop partnerships 
                                                 
45 Healey and Jordan, “NATO’s Cyber Capabilities,” 6.  
46 Healey and Jordan, “NATO’s Cyber Capabilities,” 7.  
47 Healey and Jordan, “NATO’s Cyber Capabilities,” 7.  
48 Jamie Shea, “NATO: The Challenges Ahead,” Global Affairs (2015), http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/full/10.1080/23340460.2015.979542, 6.  
49 Shea, “NATO: The Challenges Ahead,” 2.  
50 Shea, “NATO: The Challenges Ahead,” 2, 6.  
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with supply chain management firms and leverage the intelligence services provided by 
its Allies.51 Shea also addresses the need for NATO’s Readiness Action Plan to be 
flexible for the long-term and adequately address evolving geopolitical realities.52 
Finally, he discusses strategic messaging—a key area rarely mentioned in the typical 
NATO cyber texts. He astutely observes that for NATO to gain the budgetary support 
necessary for national defense plans and the public’s support for its security operations, 
the Alliance must educate the Allied publics on its missions and policies.53 In all, Shea 
provides a concise summary and perceptive analysis of the most pressing issues currently 
facing the Alliance. His article has informed this study of the political and strategic 
deficits affecting the organization’s readiness for cyberwar.  
J. KEN M. JONES 
The March 2015 thesis by Ken M. Jones investigates some issues comparable to 
those examined in this thesis. In “Cyberwar—The Next Frontier for NATO,” Jones 
analyzes three main areas: (1) NATO’s response readiness for cyber aggression directed 
against a member state, (2) the nature and scope of this response, and (3) the 
preconditions for an invocation of Article 5.54 He discusses the contributions the Tallinn 
Manual has made toward the establishment of legal and behavioral standards, which 
national governments—especially those of Allied member states—can employ to address 
cyber attacks.55 There is a minor historical inaccuracy when Jones states that the 2007 
cyber attacks against Estonia were brought under control after “several days,”56 when in 
actuality the attacks persisted for three weeks.57  
                                                 
51 Shea, “NATO: The Challenges Ahead,” 2–3.  
52 Shea, “NATO: The Challenges Ahead,” 4.  
53 Shea, “NATO: The Challenges Ahead,” 5.  
54 Ken M. Jones, “Cyberwar—The Next Frontier for NATO” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2015), 1, 3.  
55 Jones, “Cyberwar,” 19–25.  
56 Jones, “Cyberwar,” 32.  
57 Ian Traynor. “Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia,” Guardian, May 16, 
2007, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia, 1.  
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Jones also presents an analysis of the conditions that led to NATO’s 
unprecedented Article 5 invocation—the September 11, 2001 attacks—and applies this 
institutional reasoning to conceive of situations that may warrant another call for 
collective defense.58 After critically analyzing the Alliance’s Cyber Defense Policy and 
e-capabilities,59 Jones assesses that it is difficult to determine NATO’s readiness for 
cyber attacks that fall outside of its policies and procedures.60 Jones adds that the 
conditions necessary to trigger Article 5 depend on the severity of the cyber attack and 
the Alliance’s attribution success.61 He acknowledges that NATO’s ambiguity affords it 
flexibility, allowing the organization to respond in a myriad of ways, including 
kinetically, economically, and diplomatically.62 He concludes with several 
recommendations, the first reinforcing an argument originally raised by Healey and van 
Bochoven, who proposed the development of a cyber distant early warning system.63 
Jones goes further in recommending that the Alliance’s cyber strategy focus on 
deterrence by denial techniques.64 In addition, he recommends that NATO maintain its 
strategic ambiguity on Article 5 thresholds while increasing the level of information 
sharing among Alliance members.65 He also advocates that NATO create a multinational 
team of computer forensic and hacking experts to enhance the resiliency and robustness 
of its digital networks.66  
Overall, Jones’ thesis assesses the Alliance’s readiness to respond to a major 
cyber attack from a purely technical standpoint. It does not evaluate NATO’s readiness 
from a multidimensional optic in which political, military, economic, and decision-
making factors are weighed and considered—a gap in the body of knowledge that this 
                                                 
58 Jones, “Cyberwar,” 25–26.  
59 Jones, “Cyberwar,” 35.  
60 Jones, “Cyberwar,” 36. 
61 Jones, “Cyberwar,” 37–38.  
62 Jones, “Cyberwar,” 40.  
63 Jones, “Cyberwar,” 40.  
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thesis hopes to address. This thesis expands on the current literature by analyzing 
NATO’s capabilities, shortfalls, strengths, and weaknesses across several key areas, 
including cyber strategy, cyber cooperation, decision making, political will, crisis 
management, defense spending, and defense policy prioritization. Each of these 
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III. NATO AND CYBERSPACE 
Scholars and experts within NATO, national governments, private industry, and 
academic think tanks debate how to best address the challenges associated with cyber, 
which include attribution difficulties, law enforcement limitations, private and 
governmental responsibilities, and conflict de-escalation considerations.67 Over the years, 
the Alliance has taken actions to improve its capacity to address cybernetic threats. In 
2010, the Alliance published the Strategic Concept, which provided NATO’s vision and 
priorities for security across Europe and the Euro-Atlantic region and defined the 
organization’s three essential core tasks as cooperative security, crisis management, and 
collective defense.68 While the Alliance touched upon general cybersecurity issues in the 
Strategic Concept, it put the spotlight on cybersecurity at the Wales Summit four years 
later.69 On September 5, 2014, NATO made a clear and unprecedented declaration of its 
stance in the international cyber debate.  
At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO heads of state and government publicly 
acknowledged the growing geopolitical significance of cyber defense and made three 
critical announcements in this regard. First, the Alliance affirmed that cyber defense 
would become part of its collective defense, as defined in the Strategic Concept.70 
Second, NATO declared it would apply international law in the cyber realm.71 Third, 
NATO vowed that it would consider a cyber attack that met the threshold of a 
conventional armed attack an act of war, which could trigger a collective defense 
response under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.72  
                                                 
67 Buckland, Schreier, and Winkler, “Democratic Governance Challenges,” 18–19.  
68 “Improving NATO Capabilities,” NATO, February 16, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
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70 “Wales Summit Declaration,” par. 72.  
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On July 9, 2016, at the Warsaw Summit, NATO made another series of public 
affirmations regarding its commitment to Allied cyber defense and to supporting global 
security and stability in cyberspace.73 NATO unveiled its Cyber Defense Pledge, under 
which it agreed to strengthen the cybersecurity standards and resiliency of its national 
networks in accordance with the Enhanced Policy on Cyber Defense.74 In recognition of 
the growing need for enhanced partnerships, NATO affirmed it would deepen its 
cooperation with the EU, partner nations, industry, and academic institutions through 
Technical Arrangements and the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership.75 Finally, according 
to its official communiqué, the Alliance plans to complement these policy and cybernetic 
efforts by incorporating cyber defense more fully into its operational planning, exercises, 
and missions.76  
A. DEFINITIONS 
In the physical world, the destruction of national assets, damage to critical 
infrastructure, and civilian casualties bring to mind acts of war. The attacks of September 
against the Pentagon and the Twin Towers, the 1964 attack against the USS Maddox in 
the Tonkin Gulf, and the 1941 attack against Pearl Harbor all show what acts of war look 
and feel like. In the cyber domain, however, an act of aggression is less palpable and 
more ambiguous, and thus it may bear multiple definitions.  
1. Cyber Attack 
According to the Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare, a cyber attack is a defensive or offensive cyber operation that could reasonably 
cause injury, death, damage, or destruction to persons or objects.77 Owens, Dam, and Lin 
define cyber attacks as “deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy 
                                                 
73 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” NATO, July 9, 2016, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_133169.htm., par. 70.  
74 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” par. 71.  
75 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” par. 71. 
76 “Warsaw Summit Communiqué,” par. 70.  
77 Michael N. Schmitt, ed., Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 106.  
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computer systems or networks or the information and/or programs resident in or 
transiting these systems or networks.”78 Borrowing from and expanding on the language 
in these two definitions, this thesis defines a cyber attack as a deliberate defensive or 
offensive cyber operation that causes or could cause harm or destruction to persons, 
objects, infrastructure, networks, systems, and/or programs.  
2. Cyber Incident 
In cyberspace, non-violent cyber operations that seek to obtain, manipulate, or 
exploit information are forms of cyber espionage and cyber exploitation that are different 
from cyber attacks but are frequently confused with them.79 Cyber attacks as well as 
espionage, exploitation, and hacking attempts in cyberspace are all forms of cyber 
incidents.  
3. Cyberwar 
An act of cyberwar is on a more complex scale than a cyber attack. Alison Lawlor 
Russell defines cyberwar as “a state of hostilities between countries or their agents 
(including organized non-state groups under the control of the state) that involves cyber 
operations that result in damage, destruction, or death.”80 These cyber hostilities may 
involve a constant exchange of cyber attacks and cyber incidents that could escalate into 
an armed attack in the sense of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. NATO’s 
preparedness to respond to such a major act of cyberwar is the focus of this thesis.  
4. An Act of War 
The U.S. Code defines an act of war as the following: “any act occurring in the 
course of—(A) declared war, (B) armed conflict, whether or not war has been declared, 
between two or more nations, or (C) armed conflict between military forces of any 
                                                 
78 William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin, ed., Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics 
Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities (Washington, DC: National Academies 
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origin.”81 In 2012, Harold Koh, then the legal advisor to the U.S. State Department, 
declared that cyber attacks that “result in death, injury, or significant destruction would 
likely be viewed as a use of force….[and] would constitute a use of force.”82 Thus, this 
thesis defines “a major act of cyberwar” as a cyber act that effects damage comparable to 
that of an armed attack, including loss of life and destruction of critical infrastructure, 
which rises to the level of an act of war. For NATO, crossing this line in cyberspace 
could be the trigger for a kinetic or cybernetic response under Article 5. 
B. CYBER FACTORS AFFECTING AN ARTICLE 5 DECLARATION  
Cyberwar has emerged as one of the most efficient means to expose 
vulnerabilities and effect destruction against organizations, industries, and nations. 
Frequent and severe cyber attacks against NATO members, including Estonia, France, 
Germany, the UK, and the United States, have shown the pervasiveness of these 
challenges.83 If the Alliance was confronted with a major act of cyberwar, multiple 
variables would influence NATO’s decision making. Geopolitical considerations 
notwithstanding, a decision by the Alliance to invoke Article 5 in response to a major act 
of cyberwar could depend on four main factors: (1) the type of threat, (2) the threat 
severity, (3) attribution sensitivities, and (4) the identity of the cyber attacker.  
1. Types of Threats 
Many of the challenges that cyberspace poses to NATO derive from the very 
classification of the cyber threat. Since the cyber dimension offers many ways for hackers 
to disrupt, degrade, harm, and attack, cyber incidents generally fall into various 
categories. Some experts in the cyber field classify cyber incidents and attacks according 
to integrity, availability, and confidentiality.84 Cyber attacks that compromise the 
integrity of an organization’s networks or data do so for the purposes of propaganda, 
                                                 
81 “18 U.S. Code § 2331—Definitions,” Cornell University Law School, accessed August 1, 2016, 
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82 Koh quoted in David S. Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act (Washington, DC: United States Institute of 
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disinformation, coercion, intimidation, or destruction.85 In 2014, North Korea’s hacking 
of Sony Pictures Entertainment employed this method of cyber blackmail—threatening 
destructive actions—in an attempt to block the release of a movie depicting the 
assassination of Kim Jong Un. Conversely, cyber attacks that disrupt the availability of 
websites and intranets are intended to prevent the public from accessing data resources 
and services, such as transportation, banking, and emergency support.86 The distributed 
denial-of-service (DDoS)87 cyber attacks that brought down parliamentary, banking, and 
media websites in Estonia in 2007 constitute a prime example of this type of threat.88 
Finally, cyber incidents that violate confidentiality target information for the purposes of 
fraud, data mining, identity and personal data theft, blackmail, and/or espionage.89 
China’s reported 2015 electronic espionage attack on the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) that stole sensitive and classified information on 22 million U.S. 
government, contractor, and military personnel exemplifies this type of data breach.90  
While these types of incidents represented significant network intrusions against Allied 
member states, they did not trigger a collective response from NATO, in part due to their 
level of severity.  
2. Threat Severity Levels 
The severity of a cyber attack across the integrity, availability, and confidentiality 
domains directly affects the level of response. Although cyber incidents within the 
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confidentiality domain are more frequent than attacks in the other two domains, 
information breaches—no matter the scale—have yet to trigger an armed conflict. While 
cyber espionage and other violations in confidentiality can become grave threats to 
national security, these activities—though prosecutable crimes—do not represent in and 
of themselves acts of war. This is partially due to the pervasive understanding that all 
countries spy on each other whether friend or foe. Another major factor derives from the 
guidance articulated under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which states that a member state 
has “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense” if an armed attack 
occurs.91 Espionage alone does not meet the requirements of an armed attack.  
While some may argue that a nation’s discovery of a particular data breach (such 
as that of its nuclear codes) could characterize an imminent existential threat and warrant 
a preemptive strike, cyber attacks against confidentiality have yet to trigger an armed 
preemptive response. If an aggressor state obtained critical information through cyber 
espionage, which facilitated an armed attack, the aggressor state’s armed attack alone 
would justify the targeted state’s resort to self-defense—not the preceding data breach. 
Many nations choose to handle violations of cyber confidentiality through non-military 
means such as diplomacy, legal prosecution, cyber retaliation, or economic sanctions.  
Contrary to electronic attacks on confidentiality, cyber activities that violate 
integrity and availability—like the distributed denial-of-service attacks against Estonia in 
2007—have the potential to trigger an armed conflict. According to Harold Koh, then the 
legal advisor to the U.S. State Department, “if the physical consequences of a cyber 
attack work the kind of physical damage that dropping a bomb or firing a missile would, 
that cyber attack should equally be considered a use of force.”92 Severe cyber attacks that 
disrupt the availability of power, water, transportation, and financial services could 
effectively shut down a country. Thus, cyber acts of war could include information, 
power, and network disruptions that cause the destruction of critical infrastructure and 
loss of life.93 At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO stood behind this judgment when it 
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declared that it would reserve the right to invoke Article 5 if a cyber attack reached the 
magnitude of a conventional attack on one of its members.94 The type and severity of the 
cyber attack would factor heavily in NATO’s political calculus to determine its 
appropriate response. 
The distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks that struck Estonia in 2007 and 
Georgia in 2008 show two high-profile cases in which availability and integrity attacks 
created social disturbances and political instability but did not rise to the level of an 
armed attack.95 In Estonia, hacktivists96 targeted media and parliamentary websites and 
took down financial services, producing inconveniences and hardships for the 
technologically reliant population.97 Cyber attacks against Georgian websites disrupted 
the dissemination of government information throughout the Georgia-Russia conflict.98 
While the cyber attacks against Georgia generated strategic-level effects, they were less 
pervasive than those against Estonia because Georgia’s economy and government were 
not as Internet dependent.99 If a state actor orchestrated such attacks against an Alliance 
member today and legal attribution was known, the attacks could possibly constitute an 
act of war. Nonetheless, if it was in the security interests of the Alliance, NATO could 
choose to respond even if a cyber attack did not rise to the perceived threshold of a 
conventional attack. Throughout all these cases, the type and severity level of the act of 
cyber aggression would factor heavily into the decision making calculus of NATO and 
the Ally attacked.100 Still, attribution sensitivities can oftentimes serve as the most 
significant priority in determining an appropriate response. 
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3. Attribution 
Cyberspace facilitates a certain expectation of anonymity.101 Identifying a 
perpetrator can be difficult in any criminal case, but when an offense is committed in the 
cyber dimension, the challenges are magnified. Accurately determining the identity of an 
attacker and proving culpability can be impractical using cyber tools.102 Often times, 
cyber criminals can disguise their involvement and conceal their identities through 
proxies. A state may know who was behind a penetration of its government network, but 
may not want to publicize this knowledge for fear of relinquishing a particular classified 
cyber detection capability. Indeed, cyber weapons are only effective as long as they 
remain a secret.103 Since a nation could lose more than it hopes to gain by publicly 
attributing a cyber attack to another entity, some may choose to forego making an 
attribution finding public.104  
Even if the source of an Internet Protocol (IP) address is obtained accurately, the 
borderless nature of the Internet can complicate establishing legal culpability. For 
example, if a website that contains malware is owned in China but has a Polish address 
and a Danish host, holding the proper party accountable becomes a daunting 
challenge.105 Aside from legal complications, the protracted length of time required to 
ascertain the true identity of a cybercriminal can corrode the credibility and legitimacy of 
attribution on the political stage and hinder the prosecution of the guilty parties. 
Nonetheless, attribution of any crime is a prerequisite to formal action. To 
legitimize a response of collective defense, NATO would have to attribute and in some 
way show how it identified the culprit behind the act of cyberwar, which targeted one or 
more of its members; failure to do so would impede an Allied response. If NATO or an 
Ally was able to publicly attribute a cyber attack without a compromise of its cybernetic 
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capabilities, then an Article 5 response might be likely. Much would also depend, 
however, on the type of cyber aggression launched, the severity of the cyber attack, and 
the identity of the cyber actor. 
4. Cyber State and Non-State Actors 
The perpetrators of cybercrime and cyber terrorism come in many forms. Non-
state actors, including spyware and malware authors, spammers, phishers, disgruntled 
insiders, botnet operators, and other black-hat hackers may initiate cyber attacks at an 
individual or small-unit scale.106 States and corporations can operate with organized 
crime factions and militias to perform sabotage or industrial espionage—the collection of 
a corporation’s intellectual, personnel, and/or proprietary information for commercial 
and/or political ends.107 Hacktivists, like the alleged perpetrators in the cyber attacks 
against Estonia and Georgia in 2007 and 2008, respectively, initiate cyber campaigns 
against corporations and state actors typically for political, ideological, or financial 
purposes.108 Terrorists use cyber methods to fight asymmetrically against stronger state 
actors to damage a nation’s critical infrastructure, harm its citizens, and shake public 
confidence.109  
This thesis assesses the prospects for terrorist and state actors to provoke an 
Article 5 declaration due to the high probability that it would take a major act of 
cyberwar by one of these two types of aggressors to elicit a collective and forceful 
response from the Alliance. 
Although state and non-state actors commit millions of cyber attacks against 
NATO and its members every day, most of these acts have not provoked and would not 
elicit an official collective reaction.110 Even when NATO’s own networks have been 
hacked, the Alliance has historically not responded with force. In 2012, when Anders 
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Fogh Rasmussen, then the Secretary General, stated that NATO had experienced “over 
2500 ‘significant cases’ of cyber attacks on its systems,” none of them triggered an 
official collective response.111 In 2014, NATO’s Wales Summit Declaration showed a 
shift in organizational mindset. NATO declared for the first time in its history that it 
would reserve the right to invoke Article 5 in the event of a major cyber attack that 
reached the magnitude of a conventional attack on one of its members.112 Although 
NATO would normally respond to small-scale attacks through defensive technical means 
or through the deployment of a Rapid Reaction Team (RRT) or unit from the NATO 
Communications and Information Systems (CIS) Group, there is a high probability that it 
would take a major state-sponsored or terrorist act of cyber aggression to provoke an 
Article 5 response—a response that would be tailored to the contingency and different for 
each actor.113  
a. Scenario One: Terrorist Actor 
If a terrorist organization attacked an Ally in cyberspace at the severity level of an 
armed attack, NATO would respond appropriately. For example, if the Islamic State of 
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) engineered a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack 
against a NATO member that caused severe damage to national power grids, 
contamination of public water supplies, paralysis of government web services, and/or loss 
of life, there is a high probability that the Allied member would invoke Article 4 for 
consultations with its Allies. The North Atlantic Council (NAC) would likely vote either 
to deploy a Rapid Reaction Team (RRT) without an Article 5 invocation or approve an 
Article 5 response that might include a mixture of military support and cyber defensive 
solutions, including RRT deployment. The Alliance could seek a UN Security Council 
Resolution to secure legitimacy for its efforts—like it did after the September attacks; 
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however, if it failed to obtain such a resolution, NATO could still decide to engage with 
force—on the basis of Article 51 of the UN Charter.114  
NATO has shown its resolve before in the face of a terrorist organization—
namely Al Qaeda—which was the only time in its history it invoked Article 5.115 The 
Alliance would likely capitalize on the opportunity to display its solidarity, resolve, and 
combined military prowess, especially within the current strategic environment in which 
revisionist powers such as China, Iran, and Russia consistently try to rebalance against 
the United States and NATO. What could be a louder deterrent to NATO’s adversaries 
than a vigorous and collective response against an aggressive terrorist organization?  
b. Scenario Two: State Actor 
In a just society, whenever a crime is committed and the identity of the 
perpetrator is known, the offender’s identity has no bearing on the legal outcome—unless 
that perpetrator possesses a nuclear arsenal. For NATO, any action that could escalate to 
a nuclear conflict would be taken with extreme caution.116 If NATO wants to maintain 
and enhance the credibility of its cyber deterrent, however, it cannot rule out physical 
retaliation against nuclear-armed states.  
In theory, it would take only one Ally, nervous about an impending nuclear war in 
its backyard, to block consensus during a vote in the NAC. In this way, NATO’s 
consensus rule could in some circumstances impede a collective action involving all the 
Allies against a nuclear-armed actor in response to its state-sponsored cyber aggression. 
Nevertheless, even if some Allies blocked consensus in the NAC, the other Allies could 
take action under Article 51 of the UN Charter. It should be noted that during the Cold 
War, individual Allies—notably the United States—made strategic overtures to suggest it 
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would not rule out unilateral actions to safeguard its own national interests.117 In fact, 
according to Naval Postgraduate School professor David Yost, “The United States 
enhanced the credibility of its extended deterrence commitments, despite its vulnerability 
to Soviet nuclear attack, by making clear to Moscow that it regarded its own national 
security interests as being at stake along with those of its Allies.”118  
In summary, no one can predict whether or how NATO will respond to a major 
act of cyber aggression directed against one or more of the Allies. Even if a cyber 
incident rises to the level of an armed attack and NATO has the political grounds and 
attributive evidence it needs to engage, this does not necessarily mean that NATO will 
respond collectively or with force. Political cohesion issues can arise in the face of any 
type of attack.  
In the past, NATO’s decisions not to respond with force have derived from 
difficulties and sensitivities with attribution. Divulging attributive evidence could expose 
certain advanced cybernetic capabilities to adversaries and possibly open the Alliance to 
further attacks. The Alliance’s abstention from a forceful collective response has also 
rested in part on judgments regarding the type and level of severity of network attacks. 
Finally, another factor has been NATO’s historic reliance on deterrence and cyber 
defense principles instead of offensive strategies. Although a NATO response to a major 
act of cyberwar will depend on the geopolitics of each case, Article 5 invocation is most 
likely when the following four conditions are all present: (1) the cyber attack occurs in 
the integrity and/or availability domains, (2) the severity of the cyber aggression meets 
the threshold of an armed attack, (3) attribution can be obtained without a compromise of 
cybernetic capability, and (4) the cyber aggression is sponsored by a state actor or 
terrorist organization.  
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IV. CYBER CASE STUDIES: CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST NATO 
ALLIES AND PARTNERS 
This chapter explores NATO’s responses to unprecedented global cyber aggression 
launched against three countries—one a NATO Ally and two NATO partners.  
A. CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST A NATO ALLY 
Cyber attacks occur every day against NATO Allies, including France, Germany, 
Italy, the UK, and the United States. One of the most severe acts of cyber aggression 
occurred against one of the Alliance’s newest members—Estonia. 
1. Estonia  
In April 2007, Estonia was struck by the largest campaign of cyber attacks on 
record after the government removed a Soviet war memorial statue, the Bronze Soldier, 
from the city center to the less prominent Tallinn Military Cemetery.119 The action was 
evidently a political attempt to “de-Russify” part of the country’s public space and/or 
reduce Russia’s cultural influence within the Baltic state.120 Estonia’s Russian minority 
community, which then comprised 26 percent of the population, perceived the 
government’s action as an affront to Russian identity, culture, and history.121 The decision 
precipitated nationalist demonstrations by the Russian-speaking populace inside the 
country.122 While the Estonian government may have foreseen public dissention as a 
logical byproduct of its actions, the type of domestic backlash that followed on April 26, 
2007 was completely unanticipated.  
What began as street riots transitioned to three weeks of coordinated distributed 
denial-of-service (DDoS) cyber attacks on parliamentary, banking, university, and media 
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websites.123 The DDoS tactics strained network servers, blocking Estonian users’ access to 
countless websites.124 Russian hacktivists and sympathizers attacked Estonia’s electronic 
infrastructure via thousands of botnets or “zombie” computers (located in 50 countries 
around the globe), whose security had been hacked and secretly repurposed for malicious 
employment.125 The cyber attacks—which were coordinated through Russian language 
chat rooms and weblogs— left Estonians without access to not only key websites but also 
to their money; credit and debit cards became virtually useless.126  
As one of the most electronically interconnected nations on the planet, Estonia was 
devastated by the cyber attack campaign. According to The Economist, in 2007 Estonia 
was ranked 28 of 70 nations for its electronic readiness, or e-readiness.127 Estonia also 
maintains an international reputation for its advanced e-governance capability. The 
country’s investments in research and development (R&D) have yielded innovations in 
information and communications technology (ICT), enabling Estonia to develop the 
popular interface Skype and to be the first country to extend e-voting to its citizens located 
all over the world.128 At the time of the cyber attacks, nearly 60 percent of Estonians 
conducted vital transactions online, including 95 percent of all banking transactions—
making this Baltic nation an extremely attractive and lucrative target.129 Due to the 
population’s extensive reliance on digital communications and the absence of cybersecurity 
protocols, the vulnerability of Estonia was easily exploited by hackers.130 After the 
                                                 
123 Buckland, Schreier, and Winkler, “Democratic Governance Challenges of Cybersecurity,” 26.  
124 Jason Richards, “Denial-of-Service: The Estonian Cyberwar and Its Implications for U.S. National 
Security,” International Affairs Review, accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/65, 1.  
125 Richards, “Denial-of-Service,” 3–4. 
126 Richards, “Denial-of-Service,” 4–5.  
127 “E-readiness Rankings 2008: Maintaining Momentum,” The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2007, 
http://graphics.eiu.com/upload/ibm_ereadiness_2008.pdf, 5.  
128 Richards, “Denial-of-Service,” 4.  
129 Buckland, Schreier, and Winkler, “Democratic Governance Challenges of Cybersecurity,” 26; 
Richards, “Denial-of-Service,” 3.  
130 Richards, “Denial-of-Service,” 4.  
 35 
Estonian government identified the botnet threat, it was able to digitally isolate its servers 
by blocking all international traffic.131 The cyberwar campaign ended on May 19, 2007.132  
While the cyber attacks against Estonia have not yet been conclusively attributed to 
the Kremlin, they bore the signs of Russian orchestration.133 In fact, not only were most 
Estonian websites defaced with Russian nationalist propaganda, but the cyber attack tools 
employed by the perpetrators were also transcribed in Russian; moreover, the Russian 
government applauded the cyber attacks and even refused to conduct any criminal 
investigation.134 According to experts from the American cybersecurity analysis firm, 
Delta Risk Consulting, “All signs pointed to Russian involvement.”135  
a. NATO’s Immediate Response to the Estonian Cyber Attacks 
Throughout the DDoS attacks against its Baltic Ally, NATO responded decisively, 
deploying its Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) and employing Western 
intelligence to help counteract the attacks.136 While NATO experts were unable to 
definitively attribute the cyber attacks to the Kremlin, the Alliance strongly condemned the 
aggression and privately acknowledged suspicions about Russia’s role.137  
B. CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST NATO PARTNERS 
Following the DDoS attacks against a NATO Ally, Russia launched two additional 
cyber attack campaigns in the Alliance’s periphery. These attacks were directed against two 
of NATO’s partners, Georgia and Ukraine.  
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1. Georgia 
From August 7–16, 2008, war between Russia and Georgia ensued over a 
geopolitical dispute regarding the Georgian territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
which had pro-Russian, separatist governments.138 Russia’s provocative activity in the area 
incited the Georgian government to mount an attack in South Ossetia, which officially 
started the armed conflict.139 Russia responded with a combined military attack on 
Georgia, which included bombing raids, a naval blockade, a robust ground combat 
operation, and a coordinated cyberwarfare campaign.140  
Russian cyber militias led DDoS strikes—similar to those orchestrated against 
Estonia—to disrupt Georgian communications; the cyber attacks defaced government 
websites with Russian propaganda and extracted military and political intelligence from 
Georgian servers.141 Interestingly enough, pro-Georgian hackers responded to Russian 
“hacktivist” militias with their own cybernetic counter-offensives.142 Despite these 
counter-attacks, the Russian military continued to demonstrate command over the cyber 
realm. In total, 54 Georgian websites within the government, banking, and communications 
sectors were attacked during the conflict.143  
The Georgia-Russia conflict marked the first time cyberwarfare had been 
incorporated and synchronized with a major combat operation.144 Yet Russia did not wait 
for physical warfighting to begin before it attacked in cyberspace. According to 
researchers, Russia began its clandestine war three weeks before bullets had even started 
flying.145 Investigators discovered countless Russian-speaking chat rooms and networks 
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that had discussed the upcoming cyber attacks for weeks.146 Indeed, Russia’s armed forces 
regularly targeted Georgian sites physically only after they had first targeted them 
cybernetically.147  
a. NATO’s Immediate Response to the Georgian Cyber Attacks 
The Georgia-Russia war occurred just four months after the Alliance had postponed 
any decision on offering Georgia and Ukraine Membership Action Plan (MAP) status at 
the 2008 Bucharest Summit.148 Owing in part to the fact that Georgia was a NATO partner 
and active in NATO-led crisis management operations, the Alliance strongly condemned 
Russia’s actions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.149 Additionally, NATO called for a 
ceasefire a day after hostilities erupted.150 While Russia’s cyberwarfare campaign against 
Georgia shut down numerous websites, the digital attacks were overall less disruptive in 
Georgia than they were in Estonia, since Georgia’s economic and political infrastructure 
had a much smaller online presence.151 The conflict ended approximately 10 days after the 
initial skirmish in South Ossetia.152  
2. Ukraine 
In February 2014, much of the world was caught off guard when Russian troops 
invaded Crimea. What began as a political dispute between Russia and Ukraine over a 
failed trade deal with the European Union (EU) ended with domestic unrest, an ousted 
president (Viktor Yanukovich), and a strategic opportunity fully exploited by Vladimir 
Putin. Within just a few weeks, Russia held a local referendum, successfully annexed the 
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Crimean Peninsula, and started a proxy war in the Donbas region of Ukraine, which has left 
over 6,000 dead and counting.153  
While Russia accomplished the Crimean annexation through traditional military 
means, it started its destabilization campaign using hybrid or “modern warfare,” which 
consisted of disinformation, psychological and deception operations, and cyber 
intrusions.154 LookingGlass Cyber Solutions, a security firm based in Arlington, Virginia, 
released a report in 2015 confirming that since 2013, Russia had embarked on a 
coordinated cyber espionage campaign—termed Operation Armageddon—which targeted 
the Ukrainian government, law enforcement, and military.155 Using simple spear phishing 
tactics,156 Russian cyber attackers were able to conceal malware in the attachments of 
official-looking electronic correspondence; once opened, the attachments infected 
Ukrainian networks and extracted intelligence that was highly valuable to the Russian war 
effort.157 Much of the classified and sensitive intelligence collected by hackers included 
information on Ukrainian military equipment, battalion troop numbers, and combat action 
plans, including the positions of Ukrainian forces, targets, and more.158 Consequently, the 
Ukrainian government lost many strategic advantages to Russia due to cyber 
vulnerabilities. As with Russia’s strategy during the Georgia-Russia war, Russian hackers 
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used unsophisticated yet effective cyberwarfare and espionage tactics in synchronization 
with kinetic military attacks.159  
Russia’s cyber operations in Ukraine have been a blend of the methods and 
techniques observed in the Estonian and Georgian cases. The Kremlin’s cybernetic 
activities in Ukraine have focused on intelligence collection to enhance the effectiveness of 
its ground campaign—a strategy nearly identical to Moscow’s actions in the Georgian 
conflict; however, Russian activities in Ukraine have also involved access denial attacks 
comparable to those observed in both Georgia and Estonia.160 The Kremlin employed 
DDoS attacks on Ukrainian political and media sites, defaced various NATO sites with 
Russian propaganda, leaked classified Ukrainian government information, and disrupted 
Ukrainian telecommunications and networks..161 As for attribution, many of the Allies 
suspected that Russian state-sponsored hackers and volunteer cyber militias perpetrated the 
cyber attacks against Estonia.162 In Ukraine, moreover, the Allies widely regard Russia’s 
state security service—the FSB—as the culprit, although evidence has been 
circumstantial.163  
a. NATO’s Immediate Response to the Ukrainian Cyber Attacks 
In the wake of Russia’s hybrid attacks during the Ukraine crisis, NATO denounced 
Russia’s illegitimate actions, calling for Moscow to terminate its military occupation and 
end its destabilization efforts in the region.164 Immediately after the Wales Summit in 
2014, NATO leaders reaffirmed support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, establishing five 
security trust funds to help Ukraine improve its defense capabilities; one of those funds was 
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for cyber defense.165 Under the Cyber Defense Trust Fund, NATO Allies have provided 
technical training, equipment, and assistance to Ukraine to help establish an Incident 
Management Center for monitoring and responding to incidents in cyberspace.166 At the 
2016 Warsaw Summit, the Alliance reiterated the commitment to its partnership with 
Ukraine by issuing the following statement: “We stand firm in our support for Ukraine’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders and 
Ukraine’s right to decide its own future and foreign policy course free from outside 
interference, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act.”167  
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V. NATO’S LEVEL OF PREPAREDNESS 
This thesis performs a qualitative analysis of NATO’s preparedness for cyberwar 
by evaluating the Alliance’s cyber strategy, cyber cooperation, decision making, political 
will, crisis management, defense spending, and defense policy prioritization. How 
successfully NATO performs across these seven areas will indicate its probable level of 
preparedness for combating a major terrorist or state-sponsored cyber attack effectively. 
 
A. CYBER STRATEGY 
In the wake of the cyber attacks against Estonia and Georgia, NATO made 
significant policy and organizational changes, some of which were already under 
development before these attacks. One year after the 2007 attacks against Estonia, NATO 
opened its cyber policy and research center, the Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of 
Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia.168 In January 2008, NATO also released its 
first strategy on cybersecurity, the Cyber Defense Policy, which was formally endorsed at 
the Bucharest Summit.169 At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO heads of state and 
government formally endorsed a new cyber strategy—the Enhanced NATO Policy on 
Cyber Defense—which affirmed NATO’s commitment to information-sharing, 
cooperation with industry and international organizations, and to the defense of Alliance 
networks.170 NATO made additional progress toward cybersecurity at the 2016 Warsaw 
Summit, at which the Alliance formally recognized cyberspace as comparable in strategic 
importance to the three conventional warfighting domains—air, land, and sea.171 In an 
effort to assess the Alliance’s readiness for cyberwar, the thesis evaluates the quality of 
NATO’s cyber strategy across three areas: comprehensiveness, execution, and clarity. 
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1. Comprehensiveness 
Over the years, NATO has taken significant steps to improve the depth and 
breadth of its cybersecurity strategy in order to address the evolving and persistent nature 
of cybernetic threats and attacks. In 2011, NATO revised its cyber defense strategy—an 
action which underscored the importance for the Alliance to strengthen its cyber 
capabilities in detection, defense, and response.172 By 2014, NATO released the 
Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defense, a classified document.173  
The Enhanced NATO Policy on Cyber Defense provides specific guidance on 
improving network capabilities and system set-up for cyber defense, detection, resilience, 
redundancy, and recovery.174 The policy outlines multiple ways to safeguard the 
Alliance’s information systems; in fact, it provides guidance on intrusion-prevention, 
network resiliency, and response capability.175 For the first time, NATO set minimum 
security requirements for Allied networks and incorporated cybersecurity requirements 
into the NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP).176 With the adoption of a unified 
policy on cyber defense, NATO also created the Cyber Defense Management Authority 
(CDMA) to integrate and consolidate its digital defense capabilities.177  
One way in which NATO protects its digital data and adheres to the cybersecurity 
protocols recommended by its cyber strategy is by storing its most sensitive information 
on remote locations inaccessible from the Internet.178 Another way in which NATO 
prepares its cybernetic defenses is by assuming its systems have already been breached, 
thereby improving network awareness while bridging vulnerability gaps and avoiding 
complacency.179 Vigilance and planning are critical aspects of the Alliance’s 
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comprehensive strategic approach toward cybersecurity. In fact, NATO has taken great 
strides in integrating its cybersecurity strategy into its operational and crisis response 
planning processes.180 In September 2015, NATO’s defense ministers endorsed a new 
Military Concept for Cyber Defense to improve cybersecurity planning within the 
Alliance’s military structure.181  
NATO also employs its centers of excellence as resources for training, research, 
and strategy development. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence 
(CCDCOE) published a guide in 2012 on cybersecurity called the National Cybersecurity 
Framework Manual.182 The document provides specific guidance to state actors on 
integrating cybersecurity into their national strategies, engaging private and public 
industry effectively, and incorporating diversified defensive cyber approaches into 
network solutions.183 While this framework offers a comprehensive national approach to 
cyber, it is only a recommendation for adoption because NATO does not fund the 
CCDCOE nor endorse the publications it releases.184 By convention, the Alliance cannot 
mandate adherence to the principles of the CCDCOE’s national guide, and this represents 
an organizational shortfall. Nevertheless, the Alliance has taken tangible steps to 
integrate cyber defense into its policies, planning, missions, command structure, and 
decision-making processes.185 By 2012, the Alliance began implementing many of the 
defense requirements of its cybersecurity policy.186  
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2. Execution 
NATO’s execution of its cyber strategy is reflected in its revised command 
structure, which is now comprised of key cyber agencies and organizations, including the 
NATO Cyber Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) Center, the Communications and 
Information Systems (CIS) Group, and NATO’s Rapid Reaction Teams (RRTs). The 
NCIRC—established in 2012—acts as the Alliance’s cyber center of gravity, providing 
24/7 information technology (IT) management and cyber defense support to 41 NATO 
sites located in Europe and North America.187 As NATO’s main staff element, it liaises 
with international stakeholders like the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN) 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) on cybersecurity matters.188 The NCIRC also serves as 
the central coordination agency for preventative and responsive cyber solutions for the 
Alliance’s networks.189 In the event of a major cyber attack, the NCIRC activates a rapid 
NATO-wide response for system repair and recovery.190 On certain occasions, the Rapid 
Reaction Teams (RRTs) are called to respond.191 NATO’s RRTs are relatively small 
units of cybersecurity experts (typically four to six people), who can offer on-site 
technical support to Allies and NATO sites that have suffered significant cyber-
attacks.192 The NATO CIS Group in Mons, Belgium—also established in 2012—
provides deployable IT experts located across the European theater to Allied nations for 
operational support, technical assistance, and exercises.193  
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As part of its command reform in 2012, the Alliance also established NATO’s 
Communications and Information Organization (NCIO), which performs command, 
control, communications, information, and cyber defense functions for the Allies.194 Part 
of NATO’s Smart Defense and Connected Forces initiatives, the NCIO is one of the 
Alliance’s largest organizations.195 The NCIO is made up of two entities: an Agency 
Supervisory Board comprised of 28 representatives (one from each Allied nation) and the 
NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), an organization that serves as 
the NCIO’s main executive body, staffed by 200 people.196 The NCIA—the 
organization’s main consultation, command, and control entity—offers another layer of 
IT support for NATO’s headquarters and external agencies.197 Like the Cyber Defense 
Management Authority (CMDA), the NCIA is responsible for identifying operational 
requirements and carrying out the Alliance’s cybernetic defense activities.198 The 
NCIA’s daily activities range from monitoring hundreds of cyber intrusion sensors, email 
servers, and NATO websites to conducting network vulnerability testing and 
cybersecurity training.199 Through these cyber agencies and resources, NATO can 
manage and resolve millions of cyber intrusions before they rise to the level of a major 
breach.200  
Although NATO’s cyber policies have assisted Allied nations in strengthening 
their network defenses and cybernetic capabilities,201 NATO as a whole safeguards, 
manages, and asserts responsibility for its own internal networks; it has historically 
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accepted minimal responsibility for maintaining day-to-day cybersecurity for its 
individual members.202 By convention, NATO encourages its Allies to assume 
responsibility for the defense of national networks.203 Multiple Alliance members, 
including France, Germany, the UK, and the United States, also regard cybersecurity as a 
national responsibility.204 Nonetheless, in the spirit of solidarity and according to NATO 
analysts (from the Author’s conversations in Brussels, Belgium, September 15–17, 2015), 
NATO’s policy is to offer technical support and training to Allies who request assistance. 
If an Ally experiences a cyber crisis, it can petition the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC), the main political decision-making body of the Alliance, to deploy a Rapid 
Reaction Team (RRT) or a unit from the NATO Communications and Information 
Systems (CIS) Group for support.205 If the problem is large enough, as in the 2007 
Estonia case, NATO can also deploy national Computer Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs) to resolve the incident and restore the affected Ally’s systems.206 In this way, 
NATO would not have to wait for an Article 5 invocation to respond to cyber aggression 
against one or more of its members; it could employ responsive measures preceding or 
following an official call for collective defense.  
3. Clarity 
NATO’s publicly declared policy on cyber threats is consciously and purposefully 
vague.207 Why? Strategic ambiguity has its benefits. According to the Atlantic Council 
panel, there is no “redline” or “determined threshold” that would automatically define a 
cyber act as an act of war.208 Leaving the rules undefined affords NATO ample room in 
which to operate. For a 28-member multinational organization that operates on the 
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principle of consensus, time and latitude for solidifying strategic-level decisions are 
critical. If NATO publicized a cyber redline, it would box the Alliance into a corner. This 
kind of policy could embolden cyber offenders and provoke massive intrusions that target 
NATO’s networks at just below this threshold. Having a defined redline could also invite 
nefarious cyber actors to cross it to test NATO’s resolve, damage its reputation as a 
leader in Euro-Atlantic security, and undermine the credibility of its Article 5 
commitments.  
Following the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO affirmed its stance on law and 
cyberspace while refusing to address cyber redlines:  
Our policy also recognizes that international law, including international 
humanitarian law and the UN Charter, applies in cyberspace. Cyber 
attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic 
prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to 
modern societies as a conventional attack. We affirm, therefore, that cyber 
defense is part of NATO’s core task of collective defense. A decision as to 
when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be 
taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.209  
However, an invocation of Article 5 does not necessarily mean that a NATO 
response would include force. Article 5 of the Washington Treaty states the following: 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense 
recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area.210  
Thus, as long as each Alliance member takes “such action as it deems necessary,” 
it cannot be found in violation of the collective defense principle.211 In the case of a 
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major act of cyberwar against one of its members, NATO could invoke Article 5 as a 
show of solidarity but opt to refrain from employing kinetic military force; instead, the 
Alliance could use purely cybernetic means or a hybrid alternative that combined 
cybernetic tools with military force to fulfill its objectives.  
In all, NATO’s establishment, organization, and employment of its sophisticated 
cyber response agencies and IT resources like the NCIRC, NCIO, NCIA, and RRT are 
indicative of how seriously the Alliance has implemented its cyber defense policies at the 
operational level. NATO’s cyber policy, standard operating procedures, and ambiguous 
thresholds for the use of military force make the Alliance highly prepared to respond 
effectively to major acts of cyber aggression against one or more of its members. If an act 
of cyberwar met the threshold of an armed attack, NATO would probably be prepared to 
manage, counter, and resolve the issue in cyberspace; still, one cannot exclude the 
possible need to take kinetic measures. Out of a numerical ranking of 1–3, the Alliance 
earned a preparedness score of 3 in cyber strategy.  
B. CYBER COOPERATION 
The Alliance understands that being prepared for cyber attacks does not mean 
only being ready to respond with an Article 5 invocation. To NATO, it also means being 
able to respond digitally with innovative resources and tools to minimize damage to its 
own and to every member-state’s network infrastructure. One way NATO improves its 
technical capability is through cyber partnerships solidified through cooperation. 
1. Exercises 
NATO leads several annual cyber-related exercises with its members, including 
Locked Shields, which is a real-time network defense event that employs realistic attack 
models in a game-based setting.212 In 2015, Locked Shields brought together 
approximately 400 participants from 16 countries to practice the latest cyber defense 
solutions.213 NATO also leads exercise Steadfast Cobalt, which tests command, control, 
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communications, computers, and information (C4I) management capability, including 
interoperability and connectivity among the NATO Reaction Force (NRF), the Very High 
Readiness Joint Task Force (VHRJTF), and national communications and information 
systems (CIS) units.214 In 2015, NATO conducted its Cyber Coalition exercise in Estonia 
with nearly 750 participants from over 33 nations.215 The Alliance also incorporates 
cyber defense into other joint and tactical exercises, including Trident Jaguar, Trident 
Jewel, Baltic Ghost, and its largest exercise—Trident Juncture.216  
2. Education and Training  
NATO operates a Communications and Information Systems (CIS) School in 
Latina, Italy that offers 124 courses on information technology (IT) management, 
operations, and maintenance.217 The advanced IT and cyber defense courses provide 
cost-effective training solutions to NATO command personnel, Alliance members, and 
Partnership for Peace nations.218 The Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence 
(CCDCOE) in Estonia also offers free technical courses to Alliance members on botnet, 
malware, and digital forensic training.219 Both the NCISS and the CCDCOE offer mobile 
training teams to deliver on site instruction on various cyber-related topics. 
3. Workshops and Conferences 
The Alliance, in cooperation with the CCDCOE, hosts numerous workshops 
annually. Many of these events, including Countering Botnets, Cyber Norms and 
International Relations, Ethics of Cyber Conflict, Human Rights in Cyberspace, and the 
Joint Monitoring and Forensics workshops, help disseminate the latest information on 
                                                 
214 “Exercise Steadfast Cobalt Tests NATO’s Communications Systems,” NATO, June 4, 2015, 
http://www.aco.nato.int/exercise-steadfast-cobalt-tests-natos-communications-systems-2.aspx, 1–2.  
215 Stoltenberg, Secretary General’s Annual Report 2015, 23. 
216 “NATO CCDCOE Command Brief,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, 
Tallinn, Estonia, January 8, 2015. 
217 “NATO Communications and Information Systems School: Courses—Course Descriptions,” 
NATO, accessed August 27, 2015, http://www.nciss.nato.int/courses_description.php, 1–2.  
218 “NATO Communications and Information Systems School: About Us—Mission,” NATO, 
accessed August 27, 2015, http://www.nciss.nato.int/mission.php, 1.”  
219 “Cyber Security Training Events,” 1.  
 50 
evolving norms, defense tools, and legal policies in the cyber domain.220 Additionally, 
NATO leads the annual Cybersecurity Conference, which brings together multinational 
private and government industry experts to discuss cyber trends and share innovations in 
cyber-based solutions.221  
4. Initiatives 
NATO sponsors programs and initiatives that have broadened its partnerships 
with private industry and partner nations on cyber-related issues. For example, NATO’s 
Science for Peace and Security (SPS) program supports initiatives with the public sector 
and multinational governments to streamline cooperation on information technology (IT) 
techniques, research and development (R&D), incident response, and information-
sharing.222 As of 2015, the SPS had nine cyber defense projects either ongoing, under 
development, or scheduled.223 In addition, NATO works closely with the Organization 
for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to promote security-building measures and 
enhance information cooperation in cyberspace.224 Moreover, as part of the Smart 
Defense project, 20 Allies and two partner nations contribute to NATO’s cybersecurity 
initiatives.225 In 2015, the Allies signed the Cyber Defense Memorandum of 
Understanding, designed to improve information sharing among NATO and national 
cyber defense agencies and authorities.226 The Alliance also leads cyber initiatives with 
non-NATO partners. For example, NATO collaborates with partners in the South 
Caucasus region on cybernetic matters to build trust, promote dialogue on shared issues, 
and develop defensive adaptive approaches.227 The Alliance regards its political outreach 
and cooperative cyber initiatives as effective instruments for strategic success. With such 
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a progressive and inclusive outlook, NATO is moving in a positive direction toward 
cyber preparedness.  
While information-sharing makes up a critical part of NATO’s cyber readiness, it 
also represents a major hurdle for the Allies. Information-sharing in the cyber domain 
tends to be greater among corporations than among governments. In fact, cyber 
heavyweights like the Governments of the UK and the United States are reluctant to share 
classified cyber intelligence among their Allies because information assurance and 
protection are weak within some member states (as conveyed by NATO analysts in 
Brussels, Belgium, September 15–17, 2015). Nevertheless, as Allies invest more in their 
critical cybernetic infrastructures and improve the security of their systems, NATO may 
well increase the level of intra-Alliance information-sharing.  
Today, NATO’s overall level of cyber cooperation makes it highly prepared to 
effectively address and counter major acts of cyber aggression against one or more of the 
Allies. If an act of cyberwar met the threshold of an armed attack, the Allies today would 
probably be adequately prepared to call upon one another for assistance. Out of a 
numerical ranking of 1–3, the Alliance earned a preparedness score of 3 in cyber 
cooperation.  
C. DECISION MAKING  
NATO maintains an integrated command structure comprised of a permanent 
civilian element, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), and a permanent military 
component, the Military Committee (MC).228 The NAC is the top decision-making body 
of the Alliance, and it sometimes operates using a “silence procedure” to obtain 
consensus among the 28 member states.229 In such cases, when a decision is put to a vote, 
silence means consent; when nations oppose a policy decision, they can “break silence” 
by writing a letter to the Secretary General within a specified timeframe explaining their 
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objections.230 This decision-making protocol reflects the equality and value of each 
member.231 The discretion of the consensus rule enables Alliance members to avoid 
confrontation on policy objections.232 Since an Ally’s acquiescence to a collective 
decision does not obligate it to actively support the proposed policy, the passive nature of 
the consensus rule allows member states to meet their Alliance commitments while 
avoiding politically contentious issues on the domestic front.233  
Although opponents of the consensus rule assert that NATO should streamline its 
decision-making process, there is some evidence to suggest the consensus rule has not 
significantly slowed down or reduced the effectiveness of NATO’s decision-making 
capability. For example, it took only 24 hours for the Alliance to make the unprecedented 
decision to invoke Article 5 following the September terrorist attacks.234 In this case, a 
lack of precedent did not prevent the Alliance from acting quickly and decisively. 
Nonetheless, in the realm of cyber in which millions of attacks may happen within 
nanoseconds, cyber or hybrid contingencies that include a cyber dimension require 
quicker decision making. 
Indeed, hybrid warfare significantly alters the strategic playing field, giving home 
field advantage to the perpetrators while muddying the view for the target and observers. 
This ambiguity slows down normal decision making for state actors and organizations, 
especially NATO. In fact, during Russia’s Crimea annexation, some NATO strategists 
contended that the Alliance took too long to respond.235 Many of NATO’s senior leaders, 
including General Denis Mercier, the Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, 
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believe that NATO’s political decision making and intelligence analysis processes need 
to be accelerated for the Alliance to uphold its security guarantees to its members.236  
In the case of a terrorist or state-sponsored cyber attack that threatens Allied 
security, the decision to invoke Article 5 would first go to the NAC. Depending on 
various factors such as the type of cyber attack, the level of destruction, the timeliness 
and certainty of attribution, and the Alliance’s strategic messaging goals, NATO might 
invoke Article 5. Still, this invocation would not obligate the Alliance to respond against 
the aggressor nation with military force. The NAC would decide on an appropriate 
response, which might not include military measures. The menu of options that NATO 
could exercise might realistically include a blend of defensive cyber measures to increase 
deterrence and enhance the resiliency of the affected Ally’s network infrastructure.  
Still, before NATO invokes Article 5, it has other options at its disposal. NATO 
has a sophisticated cyber capability—including experts on cybersecurity, intrusion 
detection, and computer forensics—that it could activate following a NAC decision to 
combat a cyber act of aggression.237 As this thesis has previously discussed, NATO’s 
Rapid Reaction Teams (RRTs) can deploy on short notice upon a request to offer 
technical assistance to NATO facilities and Allied members that suffer network 
intrusions.238 Each day, the NCIRC Center analyzes and responds to over 200 million 
cyber incidents that take place on NATO’s networks—ten of which on average are 
sophisticated attacks requiring action by the RRT.239 According to NATO experts 
(expressed during the author’s conversations in Brussels, Belgium, September 17, 2015), 
although the NAC deploys the RRT daily for its own network security, it has yet to do so 
on behalf of an Ally. Because a decision to deploy the RRT must be reached by the NAC, 
protocol might impede the team’s future efficacy in cyber response, at least in some 
circumstances. Thus, NATO’s ability to act quickly on behalf of an Ally attacked in 
cyberspace could be impeded by its bureaucratic consensus model.  
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The RRT offers the Alliance increased options in its decision-making matrix at 
the operational level of cyber warfare. With the continuing transformation and evolution 
of NATO, the organization is finding more ways to increase its flexibility, options for 
intervention, response capability, and overall preparedness.240 Nevertheless, the Alliance 
must seek new ways to ensure that its response is not delayed by its political processes. 
By delegating a greater degree of autonomy to its cyber teams, including the Computer 
Emergency Response Team (CERT) and Rapid Reaction Team (RRT), NATO would be 
better prepared to respond to an act of cyberwar against one or more of the Allies. The 
Alliance’s current decision-making processes and protocols are moderately prepared to 
respond cybernetically to major acts of cyberwar. Out of a numerical ranking of 1–3, the 
Alliance earned a preparedness score of 2 in decision making. 
D. POLITICAL WILL  
In any situation regarding a potential employment of force, the geostrategic and 
domestic political situation of each member state will factor heavily into NATO’s 
decision-making calculus. In September 2008, a poll published by the Financial Times 
revealed that the publics in three NATO member states—Germany, Italy, and Spain—
would not support the employment of their national armed forces to defend Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania if these nations were attacked.241 In contrast, a majority of the 
publics in France and the UK supported honoring their Article 5 commitments to defend 
their Baltic Allies.242 Some NATO Allies, including the Baltic states, the Czech 
Republic, and Poland, have long voiced concerns regarding the political will of fellow 
Alliance members to honor their collective defense commitments.243 Indeed, in the wake 
of Russian aggression in Georgia and Ukraine, many of the Central and Eastern European 
Allies have expressed anxiety about the political and military resolve of the Alliance to 
respond to a Russian hybrid war campaign launched against a NATO member.244  
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A study undertaken by the Pew Research Center in the spring of 2015, which 
surveyed public opinion across eight NATO countries—Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Poland, Spain, the UK, and the United States—also showed a large divide in the 
willingness of these populaces to use military force to defend a NATO Ally attacked by 
Russia.245 While the willingness of support across the Allied nations surveyed averaged 
only around 47 percent, the countries that most clearly supported a use of force to defend 
a NATO Ally were Canada and the United States at 53 percent and 56 percent, 
respectively.246 The two nations least favorable to responding with force were Germany 
and Italy at 38 percent and 40 percent, respectively.247 Additionally, the study showed 
that American public support for Article 5 is down from 82 percent in 1956 to 56 percent 
in 2015.248 This finding may indicate that America’s war-weariness has affected its 
willingness to come to the aid of an Ally in need. German support for NATO in general is 
down slightly from 59 percent in 2013 to 55 percent in 2015.249 These views, coupled 
with Germany’s growing diplomatic power in Europe, may have a negative impact on 
NATO’s decision making and cohesion.250 Although a 2016 Pew study showed that 
many Allied publics held favorable views of NATO (a median of 57 percent surveyed 
across 11 member states), the question of collective defense was never examined.251 In 
all, the 2008 and 2015 Pew research findings suggest that support for any NATO-led 
military campaign—in the name of collective defense—is in marked decline.  
Additional factors complicating the political will of the Alliance include 
nationalism. The sweeping rise of nationalist parties across Europe could produce 
devastating consequences for Euro-Atlantic security. Indeed, the EU is currently bearing 
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witness to the tumultuous effects of nationalist movements. The British public’s fears of 
supranational institutions usurping control over the nation’s political freedoms, 
sovereignty, and rights to self-determination are among the chief factors that drove it to 
vote to leave the EU. Moreover, the meteoric rise of French presidential candidate 
Marine Le Pen on a nationalist platform—that is, a platform in favor of a greater, more 
independent France—illustrates how nationalism could threaten the cohesion of the EU 
and NATO.252 Le Pen, who is currently expected to advance to the second round of 
voting in the 2017 French presidential elections,253 has advocated a dissolution of the 
EU, a return to the French Franc, and a withdrawal from NATO’s integrated defense 
structure (which France just rejoined in 2009).254 If France weakens its role in NATO 
and/or the EU, this could signify negative strategic implications for the Alliance. In fact, 
NATO’s adversaries—especially Russia—would exploit any divisions within the 
Alliance, including fractures in its military and strategic solidarity.  
In July 2016, U.S. Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump sent 
shockwaves through the Alliance by declaring that, if elected president, he would not 
guarantee that the United States would uphold its Article 5 commitments.255 Trump 
justified his stance—which clashed fundamentally with historical U.S. policies on 
NATO—with the fact that 23 of 28 Allies do not currently meet NATO’s 2 percent 
defense spending guideline.256 According to Trump, if the Allies “aren’t paying their 
bills” to the Alliance, they should not reap the defense benefits.257 This is a seemingly 
logical argument—except that NATO’s 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
spending guideline is a recommendation, not a requirement. Nor is this spending 
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guideline a part of the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, since it was agreed upon in 2006.258 
For the Allies most exposed to an attack—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland—this 
declaration from the prospective head of state of their strongest and closest Ally is 
alarming.259 If Trump was elected president, his statements could undermine the political 
progress the United States has made through its billion-dollar European Reassurance 
Initiative (ERI) program, begun in June 2014 in the aftermath of Russian aggression in 
Crimea and Ukraine.260 Through increased U.S. military presence in Eastern and Central 
Europe, the initiative has attempted to reassure NATO’s Allies and partners of American 
resolve and commitment to their security and territorial integrity.261 Now, with Trump’s 
imprudent remarks, the United States risks signaling to Moscow that it will not stand in 
its way if Russia decides to threaten its NATO neighbors.262 Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a 
former NATO Secretary General, has expressed similar judgments regarding this 
issue.263  
Although NATO’s one-nation, one-vote consensus principle reinforces the idea 
that each Ally is equal, is this in fact the case in the eyes of specific Allies? The nations 
surveyed during the 2008 and 2015 Pew studies are among the Alliance’s top security 
contributors. Indeed, many of them also have the largest political influence within 
NATO. Their reluctance to employ force to protect fellow Allies could corrode the 
Alliance’s solidarity and adversely influence future defense policies.  
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If the publics and presidential frontrunners in major NATO nations are unwilling 
to uphold national commitments under the Washington Treaty after an armed attack on 
an Ally, what does this waning support imply for their resolve to do so in reply to a 
perceived lesser assault in cyberspace? Waning public support for honoring Article 5 
commitments may signify an even lower willingness to meet NATO’s collective defense 
obligations in response to an act of terrorist or state-sponsored cyber aggression. Some 
public opinion polls suggest that if a cyber threat met the threshold of an armed attack, 
NATO might be less prepared politically to invoke Article 5 than in a case of 
conventional military aggression. While polling is an important tool in political decision 
making, in practice governments take many factors in addition to public surveys into 
account in deciding whether and how to use force. Declines in political will and public 
support for NATO’s collective defense principle in some Allied member states have left 
NATO minimally prepared to respond effectively to major acts of cyber aggression 
against one or more of its members, particularly when that response necessitates the use 
of military force. Out of a numerical ranking of 1–3, the Alliance earned a preparedness 
score of 1 in political will.  
E. CRISIS MANAGEMENT  
As this thesis has shown, NATO has evolved organizationally to address 
burgeoning threats in the digital dimension; it has created multiple cyber response 
agencies, centers, and teams and updated its policies to reflect heightened cybersecurity 
standards. From an organizational and cybernetic standpoint, NATO is highly prepared 
for cyberwar. Yet if cyber aggression turned kinetic against an Ally, would the Alliance 
be effective in conducting a combined military campaign? The Alliance has led multiple 
counter-piracy missions, including Operations Allied Protector and Ocean Shield, support 
missions for the Africa Union, peace-time operations such as the Baltic Air Policing 
(BAP) mission, and humanitarian assistance and relief activities for Pakistan, Portugal, 
Turkey, Ukraine, and the United States.264 Yet, NATO has conducted only four major 
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combat operations as a coalition. An examination of these four operations is the next 
subject of this thesis. 
1. Bosnia: Operation Deliberate Force 
NATO conducted its first-ever combat operation from August 30, 1995 to 
September 20, 1995 within the former Yugoslavia.265 Although the Alliance conducted 
an arms embargo and a no-fly zone in the Balkan region as early as July 1992, NATO did 
not engage in major strike operations against Serbia until three years later.266 After the 
July 1995 massacre in Srebrenica, in which Bosnian Serbs slaughtered 7,079 Bosnian 
Muslim men and boys within a UN safe zone, the UN requested NATO intervention to 
assist the efforts of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR).267 Under the 
auspices of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 781, 816, and 836, 
NATO’s air and artillery campaign aimed to bring peace and stability to the former 
Yugoslavia, which had been entrenched in an ethnic civil war since 1991.268 After just 
three weeks, NATO successfully suppressed and overwhelmed the air defenses of the 
Bosnian Serbs.269 Through its judicious employment of airpower, NATO was 
internationally credited with effectively ending the Bosnian War.270  
During the campaign, NATO employed various electronic technologies and 
information resources within the cybernetic domain. In addition to maintaining secure 
lines of communication to facilitate command and control (C2) among Allied forces, 
NATO relied on satellite and IT communications networks to integrate its air defense 
systems and manage all air activities and strike engagements.271 The Alliance also used 
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electronic and signals intelligence methods to intercept Bosnian Serb communications 
and target various telecommunications and radar facilities, even severing links between 
the Bosnian Serbs’ headquarters and the capital at Belgrade.272 Moreover, Allied forces 
deployed electronic combat assets to suppress, degrade, and/or destroy ground-based 
emitters for enemy air defense systems.273 NATO also employed advanced sensor 
technologies to conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 
operations.274 Yet while the cyber domain played a distinct role in most aspects of 
mission planning, targeting, communications, and execution, it was not the domain 
targeted by NATO’s adversaries. For this reason, cyber defense and security played 
negligible roles for the Allies during the conflict.  
Throughout the campaign, NATO had several objectives. The Alliance had 
ultimately hoped that its military intervention would pressure Serbian leader Slobodan 
Milosevic to concede not only militarily but politically.275 The operation’s defined 
objectives were (1) to deter and reduce attacks within UN safe zones (Bosnian cities), (2) 
to force the Bosnian Serbs to remove heavy weapons from the total exclusion zone 
around Sarajevo, (3) to ensure freedom of movement for UN and non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), and (4) to keep the Sarajevo airport open.276  
These objectives came with challenges. Coordination between the bureaucratic 
command and control (C2) structures of NATO and the UN often slowed down decision 
making, which put tactical forces on the ground at risk.277 In addition, the divergent 
interests and political dispositions of NATO members, like Germany (which favored the 
Croats), Greece (which favored the Serbs), and Turkey (which favored the Bosnians) 
threatened Allied consensus.278 Another variable that factored into the organization’s 
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wartime calculus was the role that each NATO member preferred to play. Dissimilar 
strategic visions, like those of the United States and Germany (which favored a strong 
military intervention) and those of the UK and France (which favored a peacekeeping 
role) complicated the strategic scope of NATO’s involvement.279 While the European 
Allies had a large political function in the planning and execution of the effort, they were 
less involved militarily.280 The United States comprised about 45 percent of forces 
assigned and flew nearly 66 percent of the air missions, totaling 2,318 sorties.281  
Some critics assert that the unanimity component of the consensus-driven North 
Atlantic Council (NAC) delayed NATO’s large-scale intervention in the Balkan region 
until 1995.282 Yet, once the Alliance actually intervened, it was instrumental to the 
establishment of regional stability and the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR), 
which replaced UNPROFOR.283 Through constant intra-Alliance cooperation and 
military coordination with the UN, NATO ultimately met its military objectives in 
Operation Deliberate Force, setting the geo-strategic stage for the future achievements of 
the Dayton Peace Accords.284 By 1996, NATO established the Stabilization Force 
(SFOR) to assist with the country’s reconstruction effort and implement necessary 
regional security measures.285 While NATO ended the SFOR mission and transferred its 
stabilization responsibilities to the EU in December 2004,286 questions about the 
effectiveness of its stabilization efforts remain. Although the Dayton Accords brought the 
Bosnian ethnic conflict to a close, hostilities later re-emerged in another region of the 
Balkans—Kosovo. 
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2. Kosovo: Operation Allied Force 
Before cyber aggression was launched against Estonia (2007), Georgia (2008), 
and Ukraine (2013-present), the Alliance as a whole experienced its first string of major 
cyber attacks during the Kosovo conflict.287 From March 23, 1999 to June 10, 1999, 
NATO conducted a 78-day air-strike operation in response to Serbian President Slobodan 
Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing campaign.288 The genocide against Kosovar Albanians left 
over 250,000 dead and hundreds of thousands of Kosovar refugees displaced.289  
During the Kosovo mission, Serbian hackers and Yugoslav Army forces disrupted 
NATO’s digital infrastructure—including its websites, servers, and email 
communications.290 By employing various intrusion techniques, including the Packet 
Internet Groper (PING) bombardment strategy that sent constant pings and messages to 
NATO’s servers, hackers were able to overwhelm and take offline key NATO 
websites.291 Due to the disruptions, NATO’s public affairs website was inoperable for 
several days, which delayed the Alliance in communicating its version of events to the 
public.292 Serbian hackers also attacked NATO’s email infrastructure using the Happy 
1999 macro self-spreading virus, which worked by preventing the Allies’ computers from 
properly interfacing with the Internet and crashing their screens with a fireworks 
animation.293 Additionally, hackers from all over the world, including China and Russia, 
targeted the servers of Allied governments and militaries, including those of the United 
                                                 
287 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 44.  
288 Gregory Ball, “Operation Allied Force,” August 23, 2012, http://www.afhso.af.mil/topics/
factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=18652, 1.  
289 Ball, “Operation Allied Force,” 1.  
290 Yost, NATO’s Balancing Act, 44.  
291 Dan Verton, “Serbs Launch Cyber Attack on NATO,” FCW, April 4, 1999, https://fcw.com/
articles/1999/04/04/serbs-launch-cyberattack-on-nato.aspx, 1; Jason Healey, “Cyber Attacks Against 
NATO, Then and Now,” The Atlantic Council, September 6, 2011, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/
new-atlanticist/cyber-attacks-against-nato-then-and-now, 1.  
292 The Evolution of U.S. Cyber Power, The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics 
Association, accessed August 13, 2016, http://www.afcea.org/committees/cyber/documents/
TheEvolutionofUSCyberpower.pdf, 19, 21.  
293 Verton, “Serbs Launch Cyber Attack,” 1.  
 63 
States.294 For example, during Operation Allied Force, White House and Department of 
Defense (DOD) websites were hacked and defaced.295 NATO also struggled with 
transmitting digital data through its joint data network.296 Because the Allies operated 
using different transmission systems and messaging formats, NATO had to resort to 
manual transfers of tactical digital information.297 The lack of interconnectivity and 
compatibility of the Allies’ tactical data systems increased manpower requirements, 
slowed operational tempo, and enlarged the potential for human error during each phase 
of its air-strike operation.298  
The electronic problems and cyber attacks encountered throughout Operation 
Allied Force dealt coalition forces their first cybernetic blow and forced NATO to take a 
hard look at its internal cyber defense protocols. In fact, the Alliance took the first steps 
to publicly address the issues concerning its cyber policies and defenses during the 
Prague and Bucharest Summits of 2002 and 2008, respectively.299 According to cyber 
analyst Jason Healey, “It was partially the 1999 incidents during Allied Force that drove 
NATO’s leadership at the 2002 Prague Summit to create the NATO Computer Incident 
Response Capability (NCIRC).”300  
From the onset, Operation Allied Force also experienced challenges outside of 
cyberspace; many of these hurdles derived from intra-alliance tensions and legitimacy 
issues. Unlike in Operation Deliberate Force, the NATO Allies in Operation Allied Force 
acted without an official UN Security Council (UNSC) mandate, which deprived the 
Alliance of credibility in the eyes of its international partners.301 In fact, UN Secretary 
General Kofi Annan criticized NATO for undermining the institution’s primacy as the 
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“sole source of legitimacy” (aside from Article 51 of the UN Charter) for the employment 
of force.302 Yet, if NATO had made formal attempts through the UNSC for authorization 
of a military intervention, any decision would have been vetoed by China and Russia, 
which still do not recognize Kosovo’s independence today.303 According to then 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, any decision by the world’s top liberal 
democracies, which were represented in the NAC, held more legitimacy than a legal 
decision made by a five-member council including two repressive regimes.304 While the 
Alliance set a potentially dangerous precedent for unilaterally undertaking offensive 
actions against a sovereign nation, it demonstrated international activism in the face of 
irrefutable evidence of genocide.305  
The Alliance also applied lessons learned from Deliberate Force throughout its 
Kosovo operation. For example, NATO took important measures to minimize decision 
paralysis, which stemmed from the need for consensus.306 By leaving subordinate 
committees out of the NAC’s decision-making process and ceding to then Secretary 
General Javier Solana decisions to execute a pre-approved airstrike plan, NATO was able 
to rapidly translate strategy into tactical actions on the ground.307 While the first two 
phases of the operation encountered setbacks due to poor weather, topography, and 
coordination challenges, NATO’s third phase of strategic air strikes (and other factors) 
compelled Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo.308  
Throughout the campaign, NATO’s political and military objectives were (1) to 
put an end to the Serbian-led violence, oppression, and military activities in Kosovo, (2) 
to compel Serbian military and paramilitary forces to withdraw from Kosovo, (3) to 
station an international military presence, (4) to ensure that displaced persons and 
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refugees were safely re-settled with access to humanitarian NGOs, and (5) to establish a 
political settlement for Kosovo that was consistent with international law.309 By June 10, 
1999, NATO had fulfilled its objectives and signed a Military Technical Agreement with 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.310 The Alliance also deployed an international 
contingent of civilian workers and security personnel for its Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
mission to promote peace and stability.311  
Although the KFOR mission has been in place since 1999 and has maintained 
between 50,000 troops (at its peak) and 4,687 troops (at its current level), Kosovo still 
remains a cradle of instability for Europe.312 In fact, many scholars believe that with 
Kosovo’s unremitting economic, political, and multiethnic hurdles, the international 
intervention in Kosovo by NATO, the EU, and other organizations, has yet to yield the 
success envisaged at the outset. Nonetheless, while stability operations remain the most 
challenging aspect of NATO’s post-conflict role in Kosovo, the Alliance was decisively 
effective during its military campaign. In 2008, all of NATO’s basic objectives were met. 
Kosovo legally declared independence in February 2008 and today is formally 
recognized by 111 of 193 UN member states and most NATO and EU members.313 At 
the end of its operations, NATO had taken extraordinary efforts to minimize collateral 
damage, completing over 38,000 sorties with zero Allied fatalities.314 These military 
achievements help explain why Operation Allied Force is regarded as one of NATO’s 
greatest operational successes.  
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3. Afghanistan: International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Mission 
After the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States, NATO forces 
assumed the lead in collective security efforts in Afghanistan from December 20, 2001 to 
December 28, 2014.315 Upon Afghanistan’s request and under the auspices of nine UN 
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs), including 1386, 1413, 1444, 1510, 1563, 1623, 
1707, 1776, and 1833, NATO was assigned the daunting task of providing security for 
the UN-led efforts to bring stability to a region in which ethnic, sectarian, tribal, and 
ideology-driven factions have competed for power for thousands of years.316  
Before and during NATO’s mission, cyberspace played a distinct role for both the 
Alliance and its adversaries. Al Qaeda—the global terrorist organization founded and 
sponsored by Osama bin Laden—began employing Internet tools to advance its political 
and military agendas in the 1980s.317 By 2001, the organization was training many of its 
operatives in sophisticated hacking, data encryption, and coding techniques.318 With chat 
rooms, website forums, online magazines, and social media sites like Twitter, Al Qaeda’s 
Electronic Army was able to disseminate information, rationalize its activities 
ideologically, relay critical intelligence, and upload propaganda videos for 
recruitment.319 Additionally, Al Qaeda frequently conducted “electronic jihad” against 
the West by orchestrating cyber attacks against NATO and U.S. cyber targets.320 Strong 
evidence also suggests that Al Qaeda coordinated the September attacks in cyberspace.321 
In fact, Al Qaeda operatives collected a majority of the intelligence on U.S. targets 
cybernetically via open source publications and communicated the information using 
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encrypted electronic messages.322 Throughout the NATO mission in Afghanistan, Al 
Qaeda and other non-state actors have also conducted cyber attacks using malicious 
viruses and malware; since the inception of ISAF, these types of cyber incidents on 
Afghanistan’s digital infrastructure have increased exponentially.323  
To confront the cybernetic challenges posed by Al Qaeda, NATO—with the 
United States in the lead—has employed various tools. During the mission in 
Afghanistan, the United States Government contracted cyber experts to lead offensive 
cyber operations.324 Specifically, the U.S. DOD employed teams skilled in computer 
network operations, especially cyber tracking, analysis, exploitation, and attack to 
support the execution of the mission in Afghanistan and the political objectives of the 
United States and NATO.325 Alongside the United States’ offensive cyber operations, 
NATO led cybersecurity training to reinforce the digital defenses of the country. In 2012 
NATO, under the auspices of the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Program, 
established a 10-day cyber defense training course for Afghan students.326 The course 
provided Afghan network administrators with critical skills training on cyber defense 
measures, coding, threat identification, and threat response protocols to help Afghanistan 
develop an institutional cyber defense capability.327  
The ISAF mission’s main objectives were (1) to conduct security and stability 
operations in Afghanistan, (2) to help develop and train an Afghan National Security 
Force (ANSF) and an Afghan National Army (ANA), (3) to identify reconstruction 
needs, (4) to support the Afghan government with disarming illegally armed groups, (5) 
to provide intelligence-sharing and information support to the Afghan government and to 
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counter-narcotics efforts, and (6) to assist with humanitarian operations.328 The Alliance 
encountered problems achieving many of these objectives from the onset.  
NATO’s efforts to build unity, military professionalism, and civic mindedness 
within the Afghan forces became nearly an insuperable task due to potent cultural and 
provincial identities. Thirteen years after its original mandate, ISAF never achieved its 
primary goal of building an effective security apparatus in the country.329 The rise of the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and factional clashes with the Taliban in the 
region complicated the already chaotic security situation.330 Although NATO succeeded in 
enabling Afghanistan to make some advancements in economic development, education, 
governance, and human rights,331 the nation may still be generations away from 
transitioning into a stable, secure, and united country. To date, since 2001 the war in 
Afghanistan has yielded 3,515 coalition fatalities and 92,000 Afghan fatalities, including 
26,000 Afghan civilians.332 While NATO officially transferred responsibility for security 
to the Afghan forces in December 2014, the Alliance has continued its mission under a new 
name with Resolute Support, which began on January 1, 2015.333 NATO’s ISAF mission 
was one of the largest coalitions in history; at its height it had 150,000 troops deployed 
from approximately 50 countries.334 While the mission enhanced interoperability among 
Allied militaries,335 it was one of the costliest and least effective initiatives undertaken by 
the Alliance.  
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4. Libya: Operation Unified Protector 
From March 20, 2011, to October 31, 2011, NATO intervened in the Libyan Civil 
War on humanitarian grounds.336 With the United States pushing for a European-led 
coalition, the Alliance began its seven-month combat operation to stop the Muammar 
Gaddafi regime from systematically killing members of the civilian population.337 With 
UN approval under UNSCRs 1970 and 1973, NATO established a no-fly zone, enforced 
an arms embargo, conducted air and naval strikes, and prevented large-scale civilian 
losses in Libya.338  
During Operation Unified Protector, the Alliance experienced only three 
significant cyber attacks.339 The first cyber intrusion allegedly extracted and released 
sensitive data from the NATO server, while the second attack occurred on a NATO 
affiliate’s website and publicized the usernames and passwords of the site’s 12,000 
registered users.340 In the third cyber intrusion, hackers used malicious email software to 
extract unclassified information from a host computer in the Norwegian military.341 
While these data breaches were serious, they were mild in comparison to the deluge of 
denial-of-service attacks that NATO experienced during the Kosovo campaign.342 NATO 
was careful not to repeat the mistakes in cyberspace that it had made nearly twelve years 
prior.343 It should be recalled that between 1999 and 2011, the Alliance created its first 
cyber strategy, outfitted its organizational structure with numerous cybernetic elements, 
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and bolstered its network security and response capabilities.344 Due to the changes made 
to NATO’s cyber defense structure, the Alliance’s cyber apparatus was more prepared for 
the network breaches it suffered during the Libyan campaign.345  
NATO’s military objectives during the Libyan intervention were (1) to stop the 
attacks and threats of attack against civilians, (2) to compel the Gaddafi regime to 
withdraw its forces, and (3) to ensure freedom of movement for all humanitarian efforts 
within Libya.346 Allied forces accomplished these objectives by enforcing a maritime 
arms embargo in the Mediterranean, imposing a no-fly zone, and conducting air and 
naval strikes against regime forces.347 By the end of October 2011, NATO was praised 
for a successful operation that had involved over 26,000 sorties, 250 aircraft, 21 ships, 
and 8,000 military personnel from Allied and partner nations.348 Operation Unified 
Protector had ended with an outward appearance of civilian lives protected, Libya 
liberated, and the repressive Gaddafi regime overthrown.  
Yet in 2012, following NATO’s immediate military withdrawal, the internal 
security situation quickly deteriorated.349 Inter-militia fighting and jihadist activity in 
Libya produced frequent attacks on civilian-populated areas, including the Red Cross 
offices in Tripoli and Benghazi, the Tunisian Consulate, and the Tripoli Airport.350 On 
September 11, 2012, the most infamous of these attacks occurred, leaving Ambassador 
Christopher Stevens and three other Americans dead.351 Today, the security quagmire in 
Libya has deepened to the point that it has been described by President Obama as “a 
                                                 
344 For additional background, see Chapter V: NATO’s Level of Preparedness, Section A, Cyber 
Strategy and Section B, Cyber Cooperation.  
345 Healey, “Cyber Attacks Against NATO,” 1.  
346 Florence Gaub, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya: Reviewing Operation Unified 
Protector,” The Letort Papers, U.S. Army War College Press: Carlisle, PA, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub1161.pdf, 19.  
347 “Operations and Missions: Past and Present,” 8.  
348 “NATO and Libya (Archived),” 7. 
349 Gaub, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya,” 28.  
350 Gaub, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya,” 28.  
351 Gaub, “The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and Libya,” 28.  
 71 
mess” and by others as “an abject failure.”352 The country now has hundreds of 
decentralized militias that are fragmented along ideological, geographical, religious, and 
ethnic lines.353 These factions have disparate interests and operate autonomously, 
creating societal schisms that have resulted in the disintegration of state institutions, the 
growth of jihadism, and the slaughter of innocent civilians caught in the middle.354 
Libya’s problems with poor governance, terrorism, and rebel militias have transformed it 
into a safe haven for violent extremist groups to operate and coordinate terrorist 
attacks.355 The United States and NATO view Operation Unified Protector as a $1 billion 
lesson learned, which has kept the Alliance (so far) out of other Middle Eastern conflicts, 
including the Syrian Civil War.356  
During each of NATO’s four major combat operations, the Alliance experienced 
many operational achievements but also some significant long-term setbacks. Problems 
with the consensus model during Operation Deliberate Force delayed the Allies’ 
involvement for several years, thereby protracting the war in Bosnia and multiplying the 
number of casualties that followed under UNPROFOR leadership. Moreover, it was only 
after the occurrence and subsequent international condemnation of one of the most overt 
cases of genocide (within the Bosnian Muslim enclave of Srebrenica) that NATO (via 
UN mandates) was compelled to act decisively.357 Once NATO intervened in the crisis, 
the Allies achieved nearly instantaneous success. By employing robust military force, 
NATO was able to pressure the Serbian government to negotiate a peace settlement, 
which helped steer the Balkan geopolitical landscape toward greater stability. Yet, the 
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peace attained through the Dayton Accords was short-lived, as five years later, NATO 
had to intervene once again in the Balkan region with Operation Allied Force.  
While NATO was operationally effective and more decisive during Operation 
Allied Force in comparison to Deliberate Force, the Alliance failed to foster a stable post-
war environment free of ethnic tensions. Today, both Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo 
remain divided along ethnic lines.358 The Dayton Peace agreement, led by the United 
States but involving several states in the Peace Implementation Council, further 
institutionalized religious and ethnic divisions through the creation of separate ethno-
federations359 for Bosnian Croats, Muslims, and Serbs.360 In both Kosovo and Bosnia-
Herzegovina, ethnic identity remains salient, and some of the same forms of ethno-
nationalism, which served to polarize society during the crises, still saturate Balkan 
politics today.361 While NATO does not share full blame for the unsatisfactory conditions 
in the Balkans, the Allies’ policy failures before and during the Dayton Accords 
contributed to the stagnation and in some cases retraction of political progress in Bosnia 
and Kosovo. Some critics hold that it is only a matter of time before another crisis in the 
region develops.362  
NATO’s Strategic Concept defines “crisis management” as military and political 
measures taken to “address the full spectrum of crises—before, during, and after 
conflicts.”363 According to the Alliance, the purpose of this core capability is to “help 
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manage developing crises that have the potential to affect Alliance security, before they 
escalate into conflicts [and] to stop ongoing conflicts where they affect Alliance 
security.”364 Based upon these definitions, some analysts would assert that Afghanistan 
and Libya are in worse socio-political conditions than they were before NATO’s 
involvement. Multiple international organizations alongside NATO—above all the UN 
and in some cases the EU—bear political responsibility for the consequences of these 
operations. Instead of improving the security situation in Afghanistan and Libya, 
NATO’s efforts (in conjunction with those of several other organizations) helped 
entrench the affected states in deeper conflict. NATO, especially in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
Libya, excelled in putting an immediate end to the hostilities, but was unsuccessful (in 
the company of many other international organizations) in establishing a stable and 
enduring peace.  
In all, NATO’s crisis management measures have failed to adequately address 
“the full spectrum of crises”365 that have developed since the early 1990s. Yet, it should 
be noted that all four NATO-led operations were expeditionary operations in support of 
collective security. This thesis makes the assumption that the Alliance would be 
responding to an act of cyber aggression. In the case of an act of cyberwar that triggered 
an Article 5 invocation, NATO would probably be more effective in managing the threat 
cybernetically than with a conventional crisis management approach involving combat 
measures. NATO’s crisis management procedures and operational performance have 
minimally prepared the Alliance to effectively manage a cyberwar that evolves into a 
conventional wartime scenario. Out of a numerical ranking of 1–3, the Alliance earned a 
preparedness score of 1 in crisis management. 
F. DEFENSE SPENDING 
This section evaluates whether NATO—under the de facto economic leadership 
of France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the United States—is prepared to respond to 
cyber aggression that rises to the level of Article 5. Only the defense investment policies 
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of NATO’s most influential members—France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the United 
States—have been assessed because of the level of economic strength they bring to bear 
within the Alliance. NATO members face budgetary and policy constraints that present 
various challenges to overall readiness. The analysis begins with a review of national 
defense spending patterns. Figure 1 shows the relative decline in defense spending for 
France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the United States between 2008 and 2015: 




In 2006, NATO’s 28 Allies pledged to spend at least 2 percent of their gross 
domestic product (GDP) on national defense.367 At the 2014 Wales Summit, NATO 
declared that any Allies whose current defense expenditure was below this 2 percent 
guideline would “halt any decline in defense expenditure, aim to increase defense 
expenditure in real terms as GDP grows, [and] aim to move toward the 2% guideline 
within a decade with a view to meeting their NATO Capability Targets and filling 
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NATO’s capability shortfalls.”368 According to this pronouncement, NATO members 
have until 2024 to increase their defense spending, but there is currently no firm deadline 
for the Allies to meet the 2 percent of GDP spending standard. Today, the nations that 
adhere to the 2 percent guideline are Estonia, Greece, Poland, the UK, and the United 
States.369 At the 2016 Warsaw Summit, NATO announced that 10 Allies met another 
NATO defense standard—to spend more than 20 percent of their defense budgets on 
major equipment.370  
While France fails to meet the agreed 2 percent minimum, the country is still 
ranked as one of the top 10 national defense spenders in the world.371 As the world’s 
sixth largest and Europe’s third largest economy, France spent close to $44 billion on 
defense in 2015.372 In 2014, France invested over $1 billion to upgrade its cyber 
defenses, network monitoring capabilities, and system encryption competencies in order 
to improve the digital critical infrastructure in its financial and defense sectors.373 
According to the government’s 2013 French White Paper: Defense and National 
Security, France is also allocating €364 billion (roughly $400 billion) between 2014 and 
2025 to help meet its three national defense priorities of protection, deterrence, and 
intervention.374  
In spite of these spending initiatives, France’s defense spending as a percentage of 
GDP has declined steadily since 2008.375 Per Figure 1, France spent about 1.8 percent of 
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GDP on defense in 2015—down 35 percent from its defense expenditures in 2008.376 
Additionally, France’s rising debt levels could pose a significant concern in the near 
future. With its debt to GDP ratio hovering above 95 percent, rising domestic discontent 
over the nation’s fiscal priorities and defense appropriations could compel national 
leaders to reexamine defense spending requirements.377  
Despite fiscal constraints and downward spending trends, domestic and 
geopolitical crises sometimes compel state actors to reevaluate past budgetary decisions. 
As with the decisions following the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attacks, the November 
2015 terrorist attacks in Paris compelled President François Hollande to increase defense 
spending; in 2016, defense expenditures rose by $671 million, bringing total defense 
spending to $32 billion.378 While this amount is still several billion less than the 2015 
figure, it shows that France may be headed in a more security-driven direction. In 2016, 
approximately $19 billion was allocated toward equipment procurement, including nine 
Rafale multirole fighters, eleven combat and transport helicopters, 25 heavy vehicles, one 
missile-outfitted frigate, and one Barracuda attack submarine.379 In 2016, the French 
were also expected to spend $4 billion on research and development (R&D) and an 
undisclosed amount on cyber warfare and intelligence.380 Because of these spending 
trends, if NATO were to respond to cyber aggression with military force, it is likely that 
France would be able to fiscally support a significant role in these operations.  
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2. Germany 
As the fourth largest economy in the world and the largest economy in Europe, 
Germany spends about 1.18 percent of its GDP on defense.381 During the period of 
European austerity (2010-2015),382 Germany’s defense spending as a percentage of GDP 
declined by 13 percent.383 Like France, Germany does not meet NATO’s 2 percent of 
GDP recommendation, but it still spends in real terms more on defense than 90 percent of 
the governments in the rest of the world.384 Additionally, out of the five NATO nations 
assessed in this thesis, Germany has the least national debt in relation to GDP. 2016 
economic figures hold Germany’s debt to GDP at just under 75 percent.385  
Due to regional security concerns deriving from the emergence of violent 
extremism and a resurgent Russia, Germany recently pledged to raise its defense 
spending gradually to 2 percent of GDP.386 In fact, in early 2016, German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel approved a defense budget increase of 2.7 percent to address the 
country’s worsening refugee problem.387 Yet, according to experts from the German 
defense ministry, the €36.6 billion (about $40 billion) defense plan will be insufficient to 
keep the German Armed Forces functional and will not fund necessary investments in 
military equipment.388 It remains to be seen whether the upsurge of terrorist attacks—like 
the ones that took place across Germany in May and July 2016—will have any effect on 
Chancellor Merkel’s defense spending calculus. For now, due to poor budgetary 
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prospects for the German Armed Forces, it is unlikely that Germany would be able to 
fiscally sustain a significant role in coalition operations if NATO responded to cyber 
aggression with military force.  
3. Italy 
Italy has the eighth largest economy in the world and the fourth largest economy 
in Europe.389 Out of the top five NATO members, it spends the least on defense both in 
relative and absolute terms. In 2016, it allocated only about 0.95 percent of GDP toward 
defense spending, which equates to approximately $18 billion.390 Additionally, Italy 
maintains one of the world’s highest government deficits in relation to GDP; at a 
staggering 132 percent, Italy is right behind Greece in terms of relative debt ratio in 
Europe.391 It remains to be seen whether Italy will require a European financial bailout.  
With a youth jobless rate approaching 40 percent and an economy that has barely 
grown since 1999, Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi has instituted various reforms to 
address some of the nation’s most pressing economic and political challenges.392 While 
Renzi has led initiatives designed to reduce some of the fiscal waste in his country, Italy’s 
polity and powerful labor unions have limited progress. Italy struggles with bureaucratic 
gridlock, economic stasis, poor bank-lending laws, tax evasion, labor issues, and 
inefficiencies in its public administration.393 In comparison to these national problems, 
Italy’s cyber issues take a backseat. Although Renzi approved a $165 million investment 
in cybersecurity in the wake of the 2015 Paris attacks,394 this will do little to improve the 
problems associated with Italy’s current fledgling digital infrastructure.  
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Having just bailed out Italy’s third-largest bank—Monte dei Paschi di Siena—
during the country’s worst banking crisis, Renzi awaits the results of a referendum on 
constitutional reform, which—like in the UK—will determine the future of his 
government.395 The referendum, currently scheduled for November 2016,396 is designed 
to minimize the political gridlock plaguing Italy’s government by making the following 
changes: reducing the Senate from 315 to 100 seats, selecting Senators based on regional 
appointments instead of direct elections, and limiting the legislative powers of the 
Senate.397 While Italians desire change, increasing frustration over immigration and 
economic issues may factor heavily into Italian voters’ political decisions in 
November.398 With the prospect of an EU bailout and the potential for Italians to usher in 
new national elections (depending on the results of the referendum),399 the likelihood of 
an increase in Italian defense spending within the near future is low. If NATO were to 
respond to cyber aggression with military force, it is doubtful whether Italy could fulfill 
or fiscally sustain any significant role in these operations.  
4. United Kingdom 
The UK is one of the five NATO members that spends the recommended 2 
percent or more of GDP on national defense. Yet its debt is also 89 percent of GDP.400 
With the UK having voted in the June 2016 referendum to exit the EU, the country’s 
economic future is uncertain. Since the referendum, economic data has shown that 
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inflation has skyrocketed in the UK.401 In addition, the British Pound Sterling (GBP) 
reached one of its lowest values in the last decade, falling precipitously in the aftermath 
of the vote (nearly 10 percent); the GBP also declined about 16 percent during the last 
year (from August 2015 to August 2016).402 Currently, the GBP is trading at 1.29 GBP to 
the U.S. dollar (USD).403 The “Brexit” decision will have macroeconomic outcomes on 
the country’s free trade, foreign direct investment, and immigration.404 (It will also have 
consequences for the UK’s—and possibly America’s—strategic influence in Europe.)  
As the fifth largest economy in the world and the second largest economy in 
Europe—after Germany—the UK spends about $55 billion annually on defense, making 
it one of the world’s highest national spenders on defense and security.405 The UK also 
has a history of sound investment in information technology and cybersecurity. In 2015, 
the UK increased its cyber budget by 76 percent to £1.9 billion (about $2.85 billion, 
based on 2015 currency exchange rates), or half of the U.S. cyber budget.406 As part of 
this budgetary increase, Parliament approved the establishment of two cyber innovation 
centers and a Defense and Cyber Innovation Fund to encourage the development of 
advanced digital capabilities.407 Due to consistent British investments in cyber 
technology and strong defense expenditure prospects, it is likely that the UK would be 
able to fiscally support coalition operations if NATO responded to cyber aggression with 
military force.  
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5. United States 
The United States is the global leader in both economic and defense spending 
terms. With a $19 trillion GDP, the United States contributes over a half a trillion dollars 
to defense requirements or about 3.62 percent of GDP.408 While U.S. defense 
expenditures represent about 72 percent of NATO’s total military expenditures,409 the 
United States directly contributes about 22 percent of NATO’s common funding.410 
Nonetheless, per Figure 1, the United States has reduced its defense spending by 28 
percent since 2008.411 This reduction in spending may be correlated to troop drawdown 
numbers in the Middle East and to the amount of debt the United States has incurred over 
the last decade. America’s debt represents over 100 percent of its economic output, 
making it one of the most indebted nations in the world. However, the United States 
spends the most by far on cyber defense. Between 2016 and 2020, U.S. cyber spending, 
including on science and technology, information assurance, and cyberspace operations, 
will aggregate to $27 billion—or about $5.4 billion each year.412 Consistent cyber 
investments have enabled the United States to maintain its position at the forefront of 
global digital competition. Despite its large deficit, the United States’ prominent 
investments in defense and cybernetic capabilities would likely enable it to fiscally 
support coalition operations if NATO responded to an act of cyberwar with military 
force.  
Out of the five primary military spenders in the Alliance, only two meet NATO’s 
recommended 2 percent spending guideline: the UK and the United States. Budget cuts 
have proven to be the chief factors behind steady declines in Western military readiness, 
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with personnel and equipment shortfalls serving as the first consequences of this trend.413 
Yet what have been the reasons for the reductions in defense spending? Several variables 
have affected and limited the Allies’ military spending over the years, including the 
global financial crisis, European austerity measures, growing demands on European 
social welfare programs, and complacent and naïve assumptions about security 
requirements.414 While a prosperous and secure Europe strategically benefits the United 
States, America’s continued financing of European security has been a chief concern for 
NATO and the United States for decades. A poor showing of defense spending by top 
European Allies and an overreliance on the American security apparatus could 
strategically undermine NATO’s valued deterrent capability. If the majority of the Allies 
fail to prioritize their own security and opt to “free ride” on a capable few, what does this 
say about NATO’s solidarity, resolve, and capability? Moreover, if spending trends serve 
as an important indicator of national priorities and political will, then declining defense 
budgets paint a bleak picture for NATO’s commitment to common defense.415  
Despite downward spending trends, most Allied governments recognize the 
pervasive need to reinforce their cybernetic critical infrastructures. Over the last decade, 
NATO’s policies on cyber defense have progressively evolved to bring cybersecurity 
matters to the forefront of Alliance defense and resource allocation efforts.416 In fact, 
most of the Alliance’s leading members, namely France, Germany, the UK, and the 
United States, prioritize cyber defense highly within their defense budgets. Nonetheless, 
the cybersecurity prioritization of NATO members should not be taken in a vacuum; it 
must be balanced against overall defense spending trends. On one hand, many top Allied 
states have increased their cybersecurity investments and public affirmations of their 
commitment to meeting NATO’s 2 percent spending guideline; yet on the other, sharp 
declines in defense spending tell a different story. If NATO were compelled to respond to 
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cyber aggression with armed force, the ability of some Alliance members to finance a 
significant role in these operations would be in serious question. Thus, disparate cyber 
and defense spending trends have moderately prepared NATO to effectively resolve 
cyber aggression with cybernetic measures and military force. Out of a numerical ranking 
of 1–3, the Alliance earned a preparedness score of 2 in defense spending.  
G. DEFENSE POLICY PRIORITIZATION 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the defense policy priorities and 
readiness of top NATO Allies to respond effectively to major acts of cyberwar using 
military measures. Only the defense policies of the Alliance’s leading members—France, 
Germany, Italy, the UK, and the United States—have been assessed because of the level 
of political and military weight they bring to bear within NATO.  
1. France 
France has one of the most active defense policies in Europe and, likewise, one of 
the most forward-deployed armed forces in the world.417 French defense policy is based 
on an operational model that differentiates its force requirements by mission set.418 The 
armed forces must be coordinated, adaptable, and combat ready to operate in dynamic 
threat environments to support deterrence, crisis management, protection, and clandestine 
operations.419 A key component and priority of French military strategy is international 
intervention, which France views as essential to not only safeguarding its own 
sovereignty and national interests but also to supporting global peace and security.420 
While France will consistently seek coalition support and legitimacy in action through the 
endorsement of international institutions, notably the United Nations (UN) and/or the 
European Union (EU), history has proven that it is not afraid to act unilaterally.421  
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France’s policy of intervention is evidenced in its numerous overseas bases and 
operations in Africa and the Middle East.422 The French maintain four permanent bases 
in Djibouti, Gabon, Senegal, and the French territory of La Réunion in the Indian 
Ocean.423 The primary purpose of France’s military presence in Djibouti, Gabon, and 
Senegal is to promote French influence and regional stability and security.424 France 
operates out of La Réunion in order to quickly deploy forces and coordinate support and 
contingency operations, particularly in the Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, and Somalia.  425 
Since 1964, France has led more than 50 military interventions in Africa, which 
have ranged in scope from humanitarian, peacekeeping, and non-combatant evacuation 
operations (NEO) to counterinsurgency, combat support, and security missions.426 The 
French have led stability operations to varying degrees in the CAR since 2008, in Côte 
d’Ivoire since 2002, and in Chad since 1986 to combat rising jihadism and sectarian 
violence.427 One of the French military’s most recent interventions was Operation Serval 
in Mali—a two-year counterinsurgency campaign that successfully drove Al-Qaeda 
militants out of the country.428 In total, France has approximately 6,500 troops deployed 
in out-of-area (OOA) operations across Africa.429 France’s history of intervention has 
yielded certain advantages. For example, the French military enjoys strategic access and 
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freedom of movement across much of Africa, including Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, 
Mauritania, and Niger.430  
Following the November 2015 Paris attacks, President Hollande approved defense 
measures that would increase the number of troops stationed in France from 7,000 to 
10,000.431 However, France has also cut its military significantly in the past decade. In 
fact, out of the 28 Allies, France incurred the largest proportional drop in military 
personnel numbers between 2008 and 2015—approximately 41 percent; military 
personnel today total around 207,000.432 Yet, as previously discussed, these declining 
numbers have not diminished France’s strategic footprint abroad.  
In addition to projecting a global forward presence, French defense policy 
recognizes that France must support national investments in science, technology, and 
specifically cyber defense.433 In fact, the body of the French White Paper explicitly 
mentions the term “cyber” 40 times; it further dedicates two pages to delineating how the 
government will strengthen its cyber defenses, such as through clearly defined security 
protocols, close cooperation with private and state agencies, and through the 
modernization of existing information technology suites.434 The defense policy even 
outlines a possible scenario in which a major act of cyber aggression could escalate into 
armed aggression and war.435 The French government has been subject to countless cyber 
attacks over the years, so its concern about macro-level cybernetic aggression aimed at its 
national information infrastructure is understandable.436 The French government views 
cyber attacks as potential strategic threats to sovereignty, security, and national repute.437 
For these reasons, the French have developed both offensive and defensive cybernetic 
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capabilities.438 In 2015, the government published its newest, most robust cyber strategy, 
which underscored the high threat prioritization level that cybersecurity has assumed in 
French defense culture.439  
2. Germany 
Some security experts perceive Germany’s foreign and defense policies as a 
model of commercial realism—meaning that its policies are geo-economically motivated 
in their approach to politico-military matters.440 For Germany, these experts contend that 
economic considerations can undermine the employment of military force when certain 
geopolitical state actors, like Russia, are involved.441 While many factors influence 
Berlin’s political decision making, some policy experts and senior German officials assert 
that Germany is on its way to increasing its defense commitments and role in security 
affairs.442  
Yet, Germany’s past policy decisions have given it a reputation for being a 
security free-rider. Since 2008, the size of Germany’s armed forces has been reduced by 
28 percent, with current numbers totaling approximately 180,000.443 According to 
Claudia Major and Christian Molling—two prominent German scholars—Germany’s 
nonparticipation in various UN and EU operations like Chad in 2008 and Côte d’Ivoire in 
2011 illustrated a lack of will on the part of an able Ally to take on international 
responsibilities commensurate with its power.444 When Berlin does choose to get 
involved in global security engagement, it typically does so under the auspices of the UN, 
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EU, or NATO.445 Yet if Germany chooses to reformulate its defense strategies, it might 
begin by obtaining public support and improving the nation’s overall perception of the 
armed forces.446 While the German government would unquestionably honor its Article 5 
commitments if an act of aggression threatened a member state, Germany would prefer 
for NATO to focus more on collective defense and less on crisis management operations, 
like Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011.447  
The government’s cautious policies and geo-economic priorities have strategic 
implications concerning Germany’s willingness to involve itself in future armed conflicts 
that could originate in cyberspace. It is likely that, rather than taking the lead in 
operations in a cybernetic conflict, Germany would assume a supporting role in a NATO-
led operation; the nature of its contribution would probably resemble past logistical 
support as shown (for example) in its EU mission in the CAR.448  
While Germany’s White Paper 2006 focused on the threats of international 
terrorism, weapons proliferation, and destabilization resulting from regional conflicts, its 
defense policy has undergone considerable revision.449 In July 2016, Germany released 
the White Paper 2016. In contrast to the 2006 defense document, which referenced cyber 
only once in passing, the 2016 paper discussed cyber a notable 76 times.450 While both 
defense policies identified transnational terrorism, global arms proliferation, and 
instability from fragile states as chief security concerns, White Paper 2016 addressed the 
emergence of three additional challenges: hybrid warfare, cyber attacks, and 
migration.451  
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The German government has had a strong cybersecurity policy and legal 
framework in place since 2011 and a national critical infrastructure protection strategy 
since 2009.452 In addition, Germany’s cyber defense policies are strategically aligned 
with NATO’s cyber strategy. Like NATO, the German government has acknowledged 
the increasing challenges that cyber attacks present, including the difficulties with 
attribution and deterrence and the limitations of international laws and confidence-
building measures.453 According to the White Paper 2016, “The effects of cyber attacks 
can equal those of armed conflicts and may escalate into the non-virtual world.” For both 
NATO and Germany, cyber events that cross this threshold could pull the conflict into 
the kinetic domain.454  
3. Italy 
Like many European Allies, Italy views NATO membership not only as a 
strategic linkage to the United States and Europe, but also as a critical means of sharing 
the economic burdens associated with national defense.455 Between 2008 and 2015, the 
Italian military decreased its force strength by 7 percent; today the Italian armed forces 
consist of roughly 182,000 personnel.456  
Italy’s 2015 White Paper for International Security and Defense identifies four 
key objectives for its armed forces: (1) national defense, (2) defense of the Euro-Atlantic 
and Mediterranean regions, (3) contributions to international operations for peace, 
security, and stability, and (4) contributions to joint operations and tasks.457 Recognizing 
its governance shortfalls in management, communication, and integration, Italy’s defense 
policy calls for additional governmental transparency and improved interagency 
                                                 
452 “Country: Germany,” BSA, accessed March 19, 2016, http://cybersecurity.bsa.org/assets/PDFs/
country_reports/cs_germany.pdf, 1.  
453 White Paper 2016, Federal Ministry of Defense, 36–37.  
454 White Paper 2016, Federal Ministry of Defense, 37.  
455 White Paper for International Security and Defense, Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Italy, 
2015, http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Documents/2015/07_Luglio/White%20book.pdf, 6.  
456 “Defense Expenditures of NATO Countries,” 8.  
457 White Paper, Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Italy, 18–19.  
 89 
cooperation.458 While the Italian government does not share France’s level of support for 
foreign intervention, Italy does view itself as a global actor willing to engage in coalition 
missions with the international backing of the UN, the EU, or NATO.459 Because Italy’s 
economic and defense priorities strongly align with the rest of the EU, the Italians—along 
with the French—consistently pursue increased European integration and cooperation 
within the economic, political, and military spheres of governance.460  
As for cyber defense, Italy’s defense policy succeeds in highlighting the increased 
significance of the cybernetic domain but only references cyber eight times in the 2015 
white paper. Italy’s published national security policy fails to articulate concrete plans for 
the development of digital capabilities in cyber innovation, deployment, and defense.461 
However, the Italian government has attempted to make up for its lack of cyber threat 
prioritization with the formulation of its national cyber strategy, the 2013 National 
Strategic Framework for Cyberspace Security.462  
4. United Kingdom 
The UK’s 2015 Strategic Defense and Security Review (SDSR) was issued in a 
geopolitical and budgetary context vastly different from its 2010 SDSR release.463 In the 
2010 review, the government made significant cuts to the armed forces and equipment. In 
fact, the government reduced the UK’s military force by 16 percent between 2008 and 
2015 to a total of 162,000 personnel.464 By 2015, much had changed; the British 
economy had recovered from the global financial crisis, and the UK’s NATO defense 
commitments in Afghanistan with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) had 
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concluded.465 Russia and ISIL had emerged as the new threats du jour, and global 
instability and ethno-sectarian violence in North Africa and the Middle East had 
generated a refugee crisis threatening European solidarity. Given the aforementioned 
global challenges, in 2015 the British government recommitted to restructuring and re-
investing in the military to render it better prepared and equipped to safeguard national 
security interests.466  
The 2015 SDSR set the UK back on the right track and properly examined the 
requirements for increasing the size and readiness of the UK’s naval fleet and 
expeditionary forces.467 According to the SDSR, the UK plans to develop a highly agile 
Joint Force 2025, which will include a maritime and special forces task group, a new land 
division strike force, and two new Queen Elizabeth Class aircraft carriers.468 While the 
defense policy underscores the need for the UK to expand its global reach, enhance its 
power projection, and increase its material and strategic investments in NATO, one of the 
UK’s top three national priorities is to remain a strategic vanguard in the area of cyber 
defense.469  
Like NATO, the UK recognizes that foreign cyber aggression against critical 
infrastructure is a major economic and security threat.470 According to the SDSR, the 
government will treat any form of asymmetric damage caused by cyber attacks as 
seriously as an “equivalent conventional attack.”471 The British government not only 
references cyber an impressive 109 times in the SDSR, it also has an entire section 
dedicated to cyber defense and a progressive national cyber strategy published in 
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2011.472 The UK—along with France, Germany, and the United States—employs the 
“full spectrum” of capabilities, which includes an offensive cyber policy for defense.473 
With the establishment of cutting-edge cyber assessment, intelligence, and response 
centers across the country and a focus on strengthening cyber innovation domestically, 
the UK pursues an active approach to defense.474  
5. United States 
The U.S. military is regarded as the largest, most advanced, and most combat 
ready military on the planet, able to execute multiple mission sets across all warfare 
domains. Of the five NATO Allies discussed, U.S. military force strength has been 
reduced the least since 2008—about 6 percent.475 Today, America’s armed forces total 
1.3 million.476 With military bases present in more countries than any other nation-state, 
the United States has the largest global strategic footprint of any national power.  
While the National Military Strategy lists revisionist state adversaries like Russia 
and violent extremist organizations like ISIL as top threats to American security, cyber 
defense remains a high priority for the U.S. Defense Department.477 In 2013, National 
Intelligence Director James Clapper affirmed that cyber aggression represented “new and 
unpredictable” threats to American security, asserting that foreign intelligence services 
had succeeded in compromising countless government and corporate systems in the 
unclassified and classified domains.478 According to the 2016 Worldwide Threat 
Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community, U.S. critical infrastructure and supply 
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chain networks, especially in the healthcare sector, remain vulnerable to cyber attack.479 
The updated threat assessment specifically listed China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia as 
the principal cyber threats to the United States.480  
As shown, the defense polices of NATO’s five leading member states are similar 
in their strategic focus but disparate in scope and character. France, the UK, and the 
United States maintain the most active defense strategies, profiting from global basing 
and strategic access and leading frequent expeditionary missions and training exercises. 
These state actors prefer to have political support from international institutions but are 
unafraid to act both unilaterally and preemptively if doing so serves their national 
interests. Germany and Italy are staunch advocates for European solidarity and thus 
subscribe (to a greater extent than France, the UK, and the United States) to a liberal 
international model of cooperation and consensus. Germany’s and Italy’s reticence to 
intervene in some international crises stems from their history and their reliance and trust 
in international institutions such as the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union.  
Cybernetically, the digital postures and policies in these Allied nations reveal an 
active strategic outlook. While the United States invests significantly more on cyber 
readiness than its Allies, the UK and France nonetheless prioritize cyber defense highly 
in their defense budgets. Over the past few years, Germany has made considerable 
progress in strengthening the digital defenses of its critical infrastructure. Out of the top 
most influential Allies in NATO, Italy has the furthest to go with its cybernetic efforts 
and must gradually allocate more resources and programs toward cybersecurity.  
If the Alliance responded to a major act of cyberwar, France, the UK, and the 
United States would probably be in the best positions to lend their cybernetic capabilities 
to the Ally in need. The active security policies of France, the UK, and the United States 
also may make them more likely to approve a NAC decision for a response of force to a 
cyber attack that reaches the threshold of an armed attack. Conversely, the more 
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restrained defense policies of Germany and Italy may make them less likely to support 
military intervention in the same regard. Thus, the national security plans, defense 
objectives, and threat priorities of the top five Allied member states have moderately 
prepared NATO to effectively address cyberwar aggression through both cybernetic 
means and military force. Out of a numerical ranking of 1–3, the Alliance earned a 
preparedness score of 2 in defense policy prioritization.  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
After evaluating the measures of effectiveness of NATO’s cyber strategy, cyber 
cooperation, decision making, political will, crisis management, defense spending, and 
defense policy prioritization, this thesis assesses that NATO is moderately prepared to 
respond effectively to a major act of cyberwar against one or more of the Allies. While 
the Alliance is well prepared to address major acts of cyberwar in the cyber dimension, 
it is less prepared to respond to the same threats with military force.  
NATO scored the highest in the areas of cyber strategy and cyber cooperation, 
meeting or exceeding most standards of readiness to effectively address, counter, and/or 
resolve a major act of cyberwar launched against one or more of its members. The 
Alliance scored moderately in the areas of decision making, defense spending, and 
defense policy prioritization, meeting the minimum standards of readiness to effectively 
address, counter, and/or resolve a major act of cyberwar launched against one or more of 
the Allies. Finally, NATO scored the lowest in the areas of political will and crisis 
management, failing to meet minimum standards of readiness to effectively address, 
counter, and/or resolve a major act of cyber aggression against one or more of its 
members. Table 1 provides a summary of how prepared NATO is across the seven key 
areas examined in this study: 
Table 1.   NATO’s Level of Preparedness for Cyberwar 
Areas of Analysis Numerical Ranking Qualitative Ranking 
Cyber Strategy 3 High 
Cyber Cooperation 3 High 
Decision Making 2 Moderate 
Political Will 1 Minimal 
Crisis Management 1 Minimal 
Defense Spending 2 Moderate 
Defense Policy Prioritization 2 Moderate 
   Overall Score 2 Moderate 




Although NATO has made significant policy and structural changes to its 
organization in order to address cybernetic challenges, it still faces institutional, 
political, economic, and decision-making hurdles. After analyzing the level of 
preparedness of NATO’s cyber strategy, cyber cooperation, decision making, political 
will, crisis management, defense spending, and defense policy prioritization, some 
shortfalls and challenges therein were identified; this thesis recommends the following 
improvements in policy and effort: 
1. Cyber Strategy 
The Alliance has made substantial enhancements to its policies for addressing 
cybernetic incidents and attacks. NATO’s organizational evolution against a backdrop 
of cyber aggression has yielded transformations in cyber policy and given rise to the 
establishment of sophisticated cyber defense agencies that enable the Alliance to 
respond capably to cybernetic threats. The institutional and structural changes that the 
Alliance has made have shown how sensitive and responsive it has been to cyber 
attacks happening within its European periphery. 
NATO’s robust Cyber Defense Policy has facilitated the establishment of 
several advanced cyber entities, including the Cyber Defense Management Authority 
(CDMA), the NATO Communications and Information Organization (NCIO), the 
NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), the NATO Computer 
Incident Response Capability (NCIRC), the Communications and Information Systems 
(CIS) Group, and the Rapid Reaction Teams (RRTs). Through its state-of-the-art 
information technology (IT) resources and cyber agencies, NATO maintains an 
advanced level of cyber monitoring, technical and legal management, and resolution 
capability. The Alliance’s deliberate policy of ambiguity regarding the parameters that 
would constitute an armed attack affords it a significant strategic advantage. In all, the 
organization’s progressive cyber strategy has effected a marked improvement in its 
cyber defense posture, which has highly prepared NATO to cybernetically address, 
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counter, and resolve major acts of cyber aggression against one or more of its members 
in cyberspace. 
Despite these cyber achievements, however, there is room for improvement. 
NATO’s official cyber mission is defensive in nature; indeed, the NCIA and NCIRC 
focus purely on cyber defensive strategies and measures.481 Yet, there is a critical need 
for the Alliance to develop an offensive cyberwarfare strategy to supplement its cyber 
defense program. China and Russia along with roughly 30 countries have cyber 
offensive policies.482 To get ahead of these security challenges, the Alliance must 
develop its own organic cyber offensive capability. Since NATO values its official 
position as a military defense Alliance, there are steps that it could take to that end.  
The Alliance could establish a new center—namely a NATO Hybrid Warfare 
Center of Excellence—specifically mandated to analyze emerging security threats and 
crises and actively train for and counter these hybrid threats through asymmetric means, 
including through cyber counter-offensive operations launched against enemy 
networks. The center could consist of a cyber offensive element whose primary 
objectives would be to rehearse kinetic cyber operations, deepen NATO’s 
understanding of enemy cyber capabilities and activities, and deliver offensive cyber 
effects on the information systems of its adversaries as needed. Because the centers of 
excellence are not part of NATO’s official command structure, are not directly funded 
by NATO, and follow a different set of rules,483 NATO does not officially or 
automatically endorse their products or activities. NATO would have the option to 
accept, share in, or reject the center’s cyber policies, actions, recommendations, and 
intelligence products on a case-by-case basis. A Hybrid Warfare Center of Excellence 
could further help address NATO’s planning, response, and intelligence shortfalls, 
which it experienced during the Russian-sponsored hybrid and cyberwarfare campaigns 
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against Estonia, Georgia, and Ukraine. Yet regardless of whether NATO chooses to 
construct a new center of excellence, it is imperative that it develop an organizational 
cyber offensive capability for defense, like its adversaries and key Allies (Germany, 
France, the UK, and the United States)484 already have. NATO’s current posture is all 
shield, with no sword in the cyber domain. This is not an astute or sustainable policy. 
2. Cyber Cooperation 
Information-sharing within the cybernetic domain remains critical to the 
Alliance’s long-term defense, effectiveness, and preparedness for cyberwar. In this 
regard, the Alliance hosts countless multilateral exercises, workshops, and regional 
initiatives that encourage information-sharing and collaboration by private, public, and 
government stakeholders. NATO’s cooperative security approach is also exemplified in 
the organization’s commitment to improving its partnerships with the EU, the UN, and 
private actors. With its progressive and determined outlook on cyber, NATO is moving 
in a positive direction toward preparedness for cyberwar. Today, NATO’s level of 
cyber cooperation makes it highly prepared to cybernetically address and counter major 
acts of cyber aggression against one or more of the Allies. 
Yet, although the Alliance has expanded its cyber partnerships and enhanced 
cooperation in the field of science and technology, the Allies must invest more in their 
national critical infrastructure, IT management, and cybersecurity protocols in order to 
enhance their cyber defense and response capabilities. Additionally, NATO must 
continue to broaden its information-sharing so that it can more efficiently leverage and 
employ its diversity as a political means of potency. Expanding cyber cooperation with 
the EU, including the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security 
(ENISA), through mutual information exchanges, collaborative workshops, and 
exercises would enhance NATO’s overall level of cyber preparedness. If the Allies 
worked more cohesively among themselves, with private industry, and with European 
national cyber authorities, they would not only cultivate higher cybernetic standards of 
readiness, but also further augment their existing capacity for deterrence and defense. 
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3. Decision Making  
NATO’s decision-making procedures present unique challenges for a 28-
member organization modelled on consensus. Although the precepts of Article 5 afford 
NATO with a myriad of collective defense options—to include cybernetic, economic, 
intelligence, diplomatic, and military measures—the rapid changing nature of hybrid 
warfare necessitates faster decision-making. For this reason, NATO’s decision-making 
apparatus is moderately prepared to respond to major acts of cyberwar.  
Currently, a decision to deploy a Rapid Reaction Team (RRT) to assist an Ally 
that has incurred a cyber intrusion must be reached by the North Atlantic Council 
(NAC), which could take days. NATO could reduce this decision-making time by 
mirroring the approach that the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) 
employs to accelerate operational planning and approval. According to staff officers at 
SHAPE (from the author’s conversations in Brussels, Belgium, September 16, 2015), 
the organization developed Graduated Response Plans (GRP) to enhance NATO’s crisis 
response capability. NATO could adopt a similar system for its cyber divisions by 
developing pre-packaged cyber readiness plans, which would be pre-approved by the 
NAC; the plans would delegate RRT or Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) 
deployment authority to the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) 
Center or other cyber divisions in the case of an act of cyberwar against one or more of 
the Allies. Delegating a greater degree of responsibility to NATO’s cyber institutions 
would accelerate the operational decisions that might be delayed at the strategic level of 
the NAC. Delegation would also streamline the Alliance’s cyber response and 
execution capability to ensure that Allies that request support receive it before a cyber 
assault builds to the level of a major attack. This methodology would complement 
NATO’s current defense adaptive approaches and make it more prepared to address 
significant attacks in cyberspace.  
4. Political Will 
Because domestic politics steer state behavior within international affairs, public 
sentiment often influences national policy and decision making at the strategic level. 
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Prior to voting on any political and military action, especially a use of force, the Allies 
will generally first consider the impact to their domestic climates. Declines in political 
will, as suggested by some public opinion surveys, have minimally prepared NATO to 
respond effectively to major acts of cyber aggression with military force. To ensure that 
an Ally that requires collective defense protection receives robust support from its 
fellow Allies, NATO must take the necessary steps to improve public understanding of 
its collective purposes within each member state.  
NATO’s Public Diplomacy Division, Public Affairs office, and Headquarters 
Consultation, Control and Communications Staff (HQC3) must work closely with the 
NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence in Riga, Latvia to improve 
messaging throughout and beyond the Alliance. Specifically, these agencies must focus 
on public opinion in the states that, according to some polls, had the least resolve to 
honor their responsibilities under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This thesis 
concurs with the original recommendations of NATO strategy expert Jamie Shea—that 
NATO must take definitive steps to educate Allied populaces on the defense necessities 
of the Alliance.485 Domestic politics should not impede the Alliance from honoring its 
collective defense commitments. For now, NATO is not politically primed to respond 
effectively to major acts of cyberwar due to the inadequacy of its strategic messaging. 
Indeed, the Allies must first outmaneuver their adversaries within information 
campaigns if they are to defeat them in the cyberwarfare domain.  
5. Crisis Management  
Throughout each of NATO’s four major combat operations to date, the 
missions, objectives, geopolitical contexts, and results were different. Operationally, 
NATO met its defined objectives during the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts, but 
performed less optimally in fostering a sustainable environment of stability. NATO’s 
coalition performances in the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts against symmetric threats 
revealed proficiencies in short-term strategic planning, which allowed it to play to its 
strengths and employ its unmatched air striking power and strategic lift capability. In 
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contrast, NATO’s operational performance deteriorated when it took action against 
irregular threats, like Taliban clansmen in Afghanistan and Gaddafi-regime loyalists in 
Libya, within regions that required a form of reconstruction that was outside NATO’s 
core competencies and defense objectives. NATO is ill-equipped to operate in 
fragmented nations that do not have the political culture and institutional and civil 
infrastructure necessary to function as states. Both Libya and Afghanistan require a 
state-building capacity that only the European Union, the United Nations, non-
governmental organizations, and national reconstruction agencies may have.  
In the future, if cyber aggression leads NATO to consider military force, the 
Alliance would probably be more successful in conducting a campaign against a 
symmetric or semi-symmetric threat than an irregular one. If NATO’s adversary is 
asymmetric or operating in an ethno-sectarian region that would require significant 
post-war state-building, the Alliance would be better off keeping the operation in the 
cybernetic domain. Aside from issues with political will, it would be acutely 
challenging for the Alliance to finance any large-scale crisis management interventions, 
given downward defense spending trends.486 NATO’s crisis management procedures 
and performance have minimally prepared the Alliance to effectively manage, sustain, 
and win in a cyberwar that evolves into a conventional war. In the event of a 
cyberwarfare campaign of aggression that rose to the level of Article 5, NATO might 
be more effective in managing the threat through cybernetic means than through kinetic 
military measures.  
6. Defense Spending 
NATO’s leading member states—France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the 
United States—are emerging from austerity measures and defense cuts at varying 
paces. While defense spending is gradually increasing, most of these nations are still 
operating against a backdrop of resource constraints. France, Germany, Italy, and the 
UK, which are also EU members, are in violation of the Maastricht Treaty’s economic 
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guidelines, which restrict national debt to 60 percent of GDP.487 France, Italy, the UK, 
and the United States all have debt levels that are at least 89 percent of their economic 
output levels.488 Moreover, GDP growth for all five nations in 2015 averaged less than 
1.7 percent, with the highest growth in Germany at 2.1 percent and the lowest in Italy at 
1.0 percent.489  
Nevertheless, despite high deficit levels and economic stagnation, the significant 
increase in cyber defense spending of France, the UK, and the United States shows that 
these Allies value cyber readiness as a categorical imperative. Moreover, if an act of 
cyber aggression led to an invocation of Article 5, the defense investments of France, 
the UK, and the United States would probably put these Allies in a stronger position to 
support a NATO-led intervention. Declines in defense spending juxtaposed with 
growing cyber defense budgets within prominent Allied states have moderately 
prepared NATO to effectively counter cyber aggression through cybernetic channels 
and military force. In the event of war initiated through cyberspace, NATO would 
likely be prepared to respond with armed force, but some Allies would be economically 
less prepared to sustain operations. The Alliance must firmly encourage its members to 
meet minimum defense spending guidelines, instead of only encouraging the Allies to 
“aim to move toward” the 2 percent of GDP standard.490 Additionally, NATO must 
actively promote stronger national investments in cyber defense among the Allies. 
Expanding NATO’s strategic messaging campaign within Allied member states would 
also assist in these endeavors, since defense spending is directly tied to political will.491  
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7. Defense Policy Prioritization  
France, Germany, Italy, the UK, and the United States have similar defense 
readiness goals and threat priorities but heterogeneous defense postures. France, the 
UK, and the United States have active defense postures that support their standing as 
national powers. Each of their defense policies underscores national ambitions and the 
need for strong, adaptable, innovative, and ready militaries that can project power, 
intervene internationally in support of Western values and interests, and cooperate with 
Allies and partners in coalition operations. Each of these three Allies has been 
consistent and vocal in demonstrating its commitment to NATO solidarity and 
collective defense. France, the UK, and the United States have demonstrated that, while 
expressions of support from international institutions and coalitions are valued aids to 
legitimacy, all three powers are prepared to act autonomously to support perceived 
national priorities. Germany and Italy, on the other hand, pursue defense policies that 
rely to a greater extent upon restraint and the critical backing and authorization of the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and occasionally NATO (as with the Kosovo 
conflict of 1999).  
As for cyber defense, the defense policies of France, the UK, and the United 
States focus strongly on cyber readiness and on how cyber incidents could spill over 
into the kinetic dimension. In the case of cyber aggression that escalated into 
conventional operations, France, the UK, and the United States would be the Allies 
most prepared to support a NATO intervention. If Germany and Italy supported a 
NATO-led operation, their contributions would most likely take the form of logistic or 
periphery support due to capability and fiscal constraints. In the event of war initiated 
through cyberspace, NATO would be prepared to respond with armed force, but 
economically less prepared to sustain operations in a protracted scenario. The defense 
policies of NATO’s leading Allies have moderately prepared the Alliance to effectively 
address and counter cyberwar aggression through cybernetic means and military force.  
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B. SUMMARY 
No one can predict exactly how NATO would respond to a major act of 
cyberwar against one or more of its members. The Allies have a menu of options 
available that they can employ to respond collectively in cyberspace or beyond. 
Although a NATO response to a major act of cyberwar would depend on the 
geopolitical considerations of each case, Article 5 invocation is most likely when the 
following four conditions are present: (1) the cyber aggression is performed in the 
integrity and/or availability domains, (2) the severity of the damage meets the threshold 
of an armed attack, (3) attribution can be confirmed without a compromise of 
cybernetic capability, and (4) the cyber act is either terrorist or state-sponsored.  
The Alliance is more prepared cybernetically than it is politically, militarily, and 
economically to respond to a terrorist or state-sponsored cyber attack on one or more of 
the Allies. NATO is highly prepared to address, resolve, and counter major acts of 
cyberwar in the cybernetic dimension, but it is minimally prepared to respond to these 
threats with political and military measures. Although NATO might be able to promptly 
counter cybernetic aggression with force, it would be less fiscally able to sustain 
military operations effectively in the post-conflict phases. While patterns of defense 
policy prioritization and spending do not provide a comprehensive metric for measuring 
a state’s defense readiness, they do offer an imperfect indicator of how prepared the 
Allies would be to support and contribute to a NATO-led intervention over an incident 
begun in cyberspace. The Alliance faces its most serious challenges with public support 
and crisis management that could make it less effective if it responded with force to 
cyberwar waged against its members. Nevertheless, if an Ally invoked Article 5 over a 
major act of cyberwar—political, economic, and defense constraints aside—the Allies 
would come to each other’s collective aid.  
The prospect of cyberwar presents a unique opportunity for NATO to strengthen 
its leadership role in the cybernetic domain, broaden its cyber cooperation with external 
stakeholders, enhance its decisional delegation practices, improve its strategic 
messaging, and increase defense spending. If the Alliance takes these critical steps, it 
will be better positioned and highly prepared to address the challenges resulting from 
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the evolving complexity and heterogeneity of incidents in cyberspace.492 Until then, the 
Alliance remains moderately prepared for cyberwar, and this is not good enough for the 
most valuable collective defense organization in the world. As a leading security 
guarantor, NATO must continue to advance its cyber preparedness today if it is to 
remain relevant to Euro-Atlantic peace and security tomorrow.  
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